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The Irrelevance of Nanotechnology Patents
EMILY MICHIKO MORRIS
Although scientists have for decades now had the ability to manipulate matter at the
atomic level, we have yet to see the nanotechnological revolution that these scientists
predicted would follow. Despite the years of effort and billions of dollars that have been
invested into research and development thus far, nanotechnology has yielded surprisingly
few end-user applications. A number of commentators have blamed this lack of progress on
the Bayh-Dole Act and other changes to patent law, arguing that, although these laws are
supposed to stimulate technological development, they have in fact had the exact opposite
effect when it comes to nanotechnology. Because universities now own too many “upstream”
patent rights with the potential to obstruct “downstream” development of usable
applications, their argument goes, the Bayh-Dole Act has caused an unnecessary drag on
nanotechnology development. This Article shows, however, that contrary to this common
criticism, patents on university-based nanotechnology research are most often simply
irrelevant.
While nanotechnology applications have been slow to emerge, this Article shows that
the latency in development is due not to patents but rather to the fact that nanotechnology is
a science-based technology and as such faces various additional hurdles that far outweigh
the potential effect of any upstream patenting by universities. Just the inherent technological
difficulties alone of working in science-based fields makes development cycles in these fields
unavoidably long. To make matter worse, science-based fields typically also face issues with
tacit knowledge and the lack of widespread expertise as well as the “valley of death” and the
difficulties of attracting investment in intermediate-stage development. Add to this mix
constraints due to concerns about public health and safety along with limited access to
proprietary materials and equipment and it is not difficult to understand why nanotechnology
development has not advanced as quickly as some might have hoped. Thus, while
nanotechnology and other science-based technologies may occasionally experience patentrelated holdup problems, development in these fields would be more effectively addressed by
looking instead at the multitude of other, nonpatent factors that pose well-recognized
obstacles in such science-based technologies.
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The Irrelevance of Nanotechnology Patents
EMILY MICHIKO MORRIS*
INTRODUCTION
Once the stuff of science fiction, nanotechnology is now expected to be
the next technological revolution.1 For over thirty years, the United States
government has invested several billion dollars into research and
development of technologies that exploit the unusual qualities of matter at
the atomic level.2 All of this enthusiasm has yielded thousands of
nanotechnology patents3 but little in the way of revolutionary new products
and applications. We have yet to see the brave new world of efficient energy
sources and targeted, cell-specific chemotherapy delivery systems that
nanotechnology researchers have been working to develop for years, and the
self-replicating nanobots we see in Star Trek and other science fiction seem
to be nothing more than that—science fiction.4 “Nanotechnology” has
become less of a technological revolution and instead more of buzzword to
create hype for otherwise mundane products that have little to do with actual

*

Visiting Associate Professor, University of Maine School of Law, and Eastern Scholar, Shanghai
University of Political Science and Law. Many thanks to Miriam Bitton, Bernard Chao, David Friedman,
Deborah Halbert, Matthew David, Stuart Graham, Lital Helman, Peter Lee, Mark Lemley, John Golden,
Lateef Mtima, Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Lucas Osborn, Laura Pedraza-Farina, Ted Sichelman, Ofer TurSinai, and Greg Vetter; the Ono Academic College Faculty of Law, Kiryat Ono, Israel. This project was
made possible in part by generous grants from The Program for Professors of Special Appointment
(Eastern Scholars) at Shanghai Institutions of Higher Learning, and from the Shanghai University of
Political Science and Law, to whom the author expresses her gratitude.
1
Graham Reynolds, Nanotechnology and the Tragedy of the Anticommons: Towards a Strict Utility
Requirement, 6 U. OTTAWA L. TECH. J. 79, 81 (2009).
2
Requests for federal funding of nanotechnology research and development totaled almost twobillion dollars in fiscal year 2013 alone. JOHN C. MONICA, NANOTECHNOLOGY LAW § 2:116 (2014); see
also Ted Sabety, Nanotechnology Innovation and the Patent Thicket: Which IP Policies Promote
Growth?, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 477, 504–05 (2005) (noting that venture capital investments are
much smaller by comparison); Rachel Lorey Allen, Venture Capital Investment in Nanotechnology,
JONES DAY,
http://www.jonesday.com/practiceperspectives/nanotechnology/venture_capital.html
[https://perma.cc/T4G3-R3VY] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016) (similar).
3
Raj Bawa, Nanotechnology Patent Proliferation and the Crisis at the U.S. Patent Office, 17 ALB.
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 699, 707 n.26 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV.
601, 604, 604 n.14 (2005); Siva Vaidhyanathan, Nanotechnologies and the Law of Patents: A Collision
Course, in NANOTECHNOLOGY: RISK, ETHICS AND LAW 225, 227 (Geoffrey Hunt & Michael Mehta eds.,
2006).
4
Lemley, supra note 3, at 602; MONICA, supra note 2, § 1:10; Douglas Sharrott & Sachin Gupta,
How to Cope with the Expiration of Early Nanotechnology Patents, 8 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 159, 160
(2011).
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5

nanotechnological breakthroughs. Any real nanotechnological shift in the
way we manufacture goods and the materials we use seems to remain a
distant future, stuck in a holding pattern as a perpetually immature field, an
“emerging science,” and a “new technology.”6 Why?
Professor Mark Lemley and a number of others have suggested that the
answer to this puzzling question is simple: nanotechnology differs from all
of the technologies that came before it.7 As the first major new technological
field after the Bayh-Dole Act8 and other related statutes and changes to
patentability standards,9 nanotechnology has experienced an unprecedented
boom in patenting, particularly on basic research and research tools. What
is more, an unprecedented number of these patents are held by universities.10
Patents on “upstream” research of this nature have the potential to obstruct
“downstream” development of usable products and other applications.11
Lemley and others argue that the Bayh-Dole Act, which now encourages
recipients of government research funding to patent the resulting basic
research, has caused an anticommons—or a thicket—of patents so dense and
overwhelming that it is stunting nanotechnology development, a problem
yet further exacerbated by nanotechnology’s potentially cross-disciplinary
nature.12 Although patents are supposed to promote technological progress,
Bayh-Dole has created simply too many patents in nanotechnology.
This Article shows that a “tragedy of the anticommons” characterization
5
JOHN C. MILLER ET AL., THE HANDBOOK OF NANOTECHNOLOGY: BUSINESS, POLICY, AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 151–52 (2005); Jue Wang & Philip Shapira, Partnering with
Universities: A Good Choice for Nanotechnology Start-Up Firms?, 38 SMALL BUS. ECON. 197, 203
(2012), http:/link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11187-009-9248-9 [https://perma.cc/Z55S-ZLAF].
6
E.g., Zia Akhtar, Nanotechnology: Meeting the Challenges of Innovation, Production, and
Licensing, 9 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 133, 133–34 (2012); Frederick A. Fiedler & Glenn H. Reynolds,
Legal Problems of Nanotechnology: An Overview, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 593, 594–95 (1994);
Lemley, supra note 3, at 605; Frank Murray et al., Defense Drivers for Nanotechnology
Commercialization: Technology, Case Studies, and Legal Issues, 9 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 4, 5 (2012).
Most commentators agree that the field of nanotechnology has existed since at least the mid-1980s. See,
e.g., Francisco Castro, Legal and Regulatory Concerns Facing Nanotechnology, 4 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL.
PROP. 140, 140 (2004) (citing nanotechnology’s “formal existence” to the publication of K. ERIC
DREXLER, ENGINES OF CREATION: THE COMING ERA OF NANOTECHNOLOGY (1st ed. 1986)); Reynolds,
supra note 1, at 87 (same).
7
Lemley, supra note 3, at 605–06.
8
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2000) (incorporating the Bayh-Dole Act’s provisions into the Patent
Act).
9
See infra text accompanying notes 60–68.
10
Lemley, supra note 3, at 601, 605–06.
11
Cf. Sabety, supra note 2, at 481 n.12 (describing “upstream” as “seminal breakthrough
inventions” and “downstream” as “follow-on . . . innovations”).
12
Lemley, supra note 3, passim; see also Joel D’Silva, Pools, Thickets and Open Source
Nanotechnology, 31 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 300, passim (2009); Terry K. Tullis, Comment,
Application of the Government License Defense to Federally Funded Nanotechnology Research: The
Case for a Limited Patent Compulsory Licensing Regime, 53 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 279, passim (2005);
Bawa, supra note 3, passim; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 81–85, 96–98.
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of development in nanotechnology is too simple. Lemley is correct that
nanotechnology development has been slow, but not for the reasons he
suggests. In fact, for many, if not most, aspects of nanotechnology
development, patents on university-based research are simply irrelevant.
This Article shows that in nascent but complex fields like nanotechnology,
technological and economic uncertainty, long development cycles, tacit
knowledge, lack of funding, and even regulatory and safety issues are likely
to be much more significant and rate-limiting than patents are. In this way,
nanotechnology is not nearly as unique as Lemley suggests;
nanotechnology’s developmental difficulties are the same, well-known
difficulties that other science-based technologies face. This is not to say that
all nanotechnology patents are irrelevant or that an “anticommons” could
never interfere in the development of nanotechnology applications. The
point here is simply that patenting of basic research, whether by universities
or any other entities, is not the problem. Those concerned about the lack of
progress in nanotechnology would be better served to look at the multitude
of other factors, such as lack of funding, limited access to expertise and
materials, long development cycles, and public-safety concerns, that are well
known to slow research-intensive fields such as nanotechnology and
biotechnology.13
The following discussion examines the characteristics of science-based
technologies and explains why patents likely play a minimal role, at least at
this point, in nanotechnology development, particularly with regard to
university patenting on upstream technology under the Bayh-Dole Act and
its related statutes. Section I provides a general description of
nanotechnology, its origins, and its potentially cross-disciplinary effect.
Section II then briefly describes the concern, as put forth by Professor
Lemley and other commentators, that high levels of university patenting on
basic research has created and continues to create an anticommons that is
stifling nanotechnology development. Section III provides a different story,
however. First, as in biotechnology, anticommons in nanotechnology are
probably more feared than real at this stage. Second, and more importantly,
Section III shows why it is more likely that development of early-stage
university research in nanotechnology is suffering not from problems caused
by patenting under Bayh-Dole but from many of the same nonpatent
problems that have always affected science-based technologies. This latter
group of problems—including tacit knowledge,14 the valley of death,15
safety concerns,16 and more17—are currently much larger obstacles than any
13

See infra Section III.B.
For a discussion of tacit knowledge, see infra Section III.B.4.
15
For a discussion of the valley of death, see infra Section III.B.2.
16
For a discussion of safety concerns, see infra Section III.B.6.
17
Infra Section III.B.
14
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that patents might pose at this point in nanotechnology’s development.
I. NANOTECHNOLOGY: THE BASICS
Named after the nanometer, or one billionth of a meter,18
nanotechnology is the study of the unique physical and chemical
characteristics of matter at the sub-microscopic level.19 At this scale,
substances often display different physical and chemical properties because
the high surface-area-to-volume ratio allows otherwise very weak quantum
forces to dominate over other physical forces.20 This difference causes the
melting points, electrical conductivity, reflectivity, tensile strength, and
magnetic and optical properties of matter to vary in surprising ways from
their macroscopic forms.21 By leveraging these differences, scientists have
been able to create some amazing new materials. Researchers have now been
successful in synthesizing miraculously light, yet strong materials, such as
carbon nanotubes that are one-sixth the weight but one hundred times the
strength of steel,22 carbon fullerenes (“buckyballs”) that can be used for
targeted drug delivery to individual cells,23 and semiconductor nanocrystals
(“quantum dots”) small enough to map DNA sequences.24 Bar-coded
nanowires can be used to create nanoscale sensors that can identify
biowarfare pathogens at sensitivity levels never before seen.25 The branched
structure of dendrimers can be used as drug-release mechanisms that
simultaneously monitor body vitals to regulate dosages.26 Nanotechnology
is expected to revolutionize a wide array of industries, including medicine,
18
As a point of reference, a single helium atom is approximately one tenth of a nanometer in
diameter, and a ribosome, a very small intracellular organelle, is approximately twenty nanometers in
diameter. D’Silva, supra note 12, at 300.
19
Id.; Bawa, supra note 3, at 704; Amit Makker, Note, The Nanotechnology Patent Thicket and the
Path to Commercialization, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1163, 1164 (2011).
20
SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS OF NANOSCIENCE AND NANOTECHNOLOGY: NAT’L SCI. FDN. NSET
WORKSHOP REPORT passim (Mihail C. Roco & William Sim Bainbridge eds., 2001) [hereinafter
SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS], http://www.wtec.org/loyola/nano/NSET.Societal.Implications/nanosi.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4KKY-U3CK]; Bawa, supra note 3, at 705; Gunter Festel et al., Importance and Best
Practice of Early Stage Nanotechnology Investments, 7 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 50, 50 (2010); Siddarth
Khanijou, Patent Inequity?: Rethinking the Application of Strict Liability to Patent Law in the
Nanotechnology Era, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 179, 187 (2007).
21
SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS, supra note 20; Bawa, supra note 3, at 705; Festel et al., supra note 20,
at 50; Khanijou, supra note 20, at 187.
22
William J. Simmons, Nanotechnology as a Nascent Technological Model for Immediate
Substantive United States and Japan Patent Law Harmonization, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 753, 774
(2007).
23
Behfar Bastani & Dennis Fernandez, Intellectual Property Rights in Nanotechnology, INTELL.
PROP. TODAY 36, at text accompanying note 19 (Aug. 2002), http://www.iploft.com/Nanotechnology.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MWB7-WVLU].
24
David S. Almeling, Note, Patenting Nanotechnology: Problems with the Utility Requirement,
2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, P8 (2004).
25
Murray et al., supra note 6, at 14.
26
Id. at 15.
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energy, textiles, and electronics, leading many to hail nanotechnology as “a
key technology for economic development in the twenty-first century”27 and
to compare nanotechnology to the steam engine, transistor, and the Internet
in its potential effect on society.28
Like many pioneering technologies, nanotechnology originated largely
through basic research performed by government-funded universities and
federal laboratories. Governments around the world have invested billions
of dollars in nanotechnology research, with private industry and investors
quickly following suit.29 In the United States, for example, both federal and
state government support for nanotechnology has expanded geometrically
over the last two decades.30 By 2001, Congress and President Clinton had
established the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) to promote and
coordinate nanotechnology research among several federal agencies,
including the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the
National Institutes of Health, and the Department of Justice;31 by 2017 the
NNI’s total investment in nanotechnology will exceed $24 billion. 32
Developed countries around the world have made similar investments in
anticipation of the “next industrial revolution.”33
The field continues to be very much in its infancy, however, and the
value of nanotechnology innovations remains highly speculative.34 Much of
nanotechnology is still in the early research stages and has yet to be
developed into marketable products.35 According to the Project on Emerging
27
Maryam Ahmadi & Leila Ahmadi, Intellectual Property Rights of Bionanotechnology in Related
International Documents, 8 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 289, 289 (2011).
28
E.g., Neal Lane & Thomas Kalil, The National Nanotechnology Initiative: Present at the
Creation, 21 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. (2005), http://issues.org/21-4/lane/ [https://perma.cc/8YES-AJB4].
29
Bawa, supra note 3, at 701.
30
Simmons, supra note 22, at 775–76.
31
Jordan Paradise, Reassessing Safety for Nanotechnology Combination Products: What Do
Biosimilars Add to Regulatory Challenges for the FDA?, 56 ST. LOUIS L.J. 465, 474 (2012).
32
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL COMM. ON TECH. & THE SUBCOMM. ON NANOSCALE SCI., ENG’G,
& TECH., THE NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE: SUPPLEMENT TO THE PRESIDENT’S 2017
BUDGET
3
(Mar.
2016),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/
nni_fy17_budget_supplement.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GXB-DXMK]. This author has been unable to find
a reliable estimate of what proportion of the U.S. government’s overall R&D spending is devoted to
nanotechnology, however, because of the interdisciplinary nature of nanotechnology and the consequent
difficulty of identifying nanotechnology funding separately from funding in other fields.
33
See Allen, supra note 2 (noting China, South Korea, and the E.U.’s nanotechnology investments);
Simmons, supra note 22, at 777–78 (noting Japan’s multibillion dollar investments in nanotech); see also
NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, COMM. ON TECH. & THE SUBCOMM. ON NANOSCALE SCI., ENG'G, &
TECH., NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUPPORTING THE
NEXT INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, SUPPLEMENT TO THE PRESIDENT’S 2004 BUDGET 1 (2003),
http://www.nano.gov/sites/default/files/pub_resource/nni04_budget_supplement.pdf [https://perma.cc/
U3KD-456H] (referring to nanotech as an “industrial revolution”). For more detail on private-industry
investment in nanotechnology R&D, on the other hand, see infra text accompanying notes 257–62.
34
Lane & Kalil, supra note 28.
35
Lemley, supra note 3, at 604.
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Nanotechnologies’ survey, 1,628 consumer products on the market
contained nanomaterials as of 2013,36 and many products contain only small
amounts of nanotechnology.37 Most of these products represent incremental
improvements to existing technologies, such as stain-resistant nanocoatings,
high-tech tennis rackets, ski wax, and sunscreen.38 Yet other products bear
the “nano” name more to create buzz than to give an accurate description of
the underlying product.39 The radical new “disruptive” technologies that
many expected nanotechnology to produce have yet to appear, however,40
leading many to note that, despite the large sums of money invested in the
field thus far, surprisingly few groundbreaking nanotechnology products
have reached the market.41 The lack of current commercial value
notwithstanding, a surprisingly large number of patents on basic
nanotechnology research have been filed by both universities and private
firms. In fact, critics claim that very few of the nanotechnology inventions
created thus far have not been patented; patents have issued on carbon
nanotubes, quantum dots, nanowires, dendrimers, atomic-force
microscopes, and many other basic tools and materials.42
At first glance, it is not surprising that everyone wants to get in early on
the patent “gold rush” of the next major industrial revolution. Closer
inspection reveals that basic research patents in nanotechnology are
something of an oddity. Patents are popularly conceived of as a mechanism
for incentivizing investment in technological research and development
(R&D) by helping investors appropriate returns on their investments ex post
by charging for access to the patented inventions.43 Because the vast
majority of nanotechnology research conducted thus far has been funded
through the federal government,44 patent protection would seem
unnecessary; technologies that have been funded ex ante through
36

Inventory Finds Increase in Consumer Products Containing Nanoscale Materials, PROJECT ON
EMERGING NANOTECHNOLOGIES (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.nanotechproject.org/news/archive/9242/
[https://perma.cc/2ZAP-UQHY].
37
Josh Wolfe, Blue Chips Stack Up on Nanotechnology, FORBES (Oct. 24, 2005, 1:00 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2005/10/24/motorola-lucent-hp-nano-ppg-cz_jw_1024soapbox_inl.html.
38
Akhtar, supra note 6, at 134; Andrew Wasson, Protecting the Next Small Thing: Nanotechnology
and the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 10, 10 (2004).
39
MILLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 151–52.
40
Allen, supra note 2.
41
E.g., Sean O'Neill et al., Broad Claiming in Nanotechnology Patents: Is Litigation Inevitable?, 4
NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 29, 31 (2007) (noting the lack of nanotechnology products in the marketplace);
Lemley, supra note 3, at 604, 623 (stating that nanotechnology “has so far produced few actual
products”); see also Dennis S. Karjala, Protecting Innovation in Computer Software, Biotechnology, and
Nanotechnology, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 42, 46 (2011) (arguing that few nanotech products on the market
truly represent the unique characteristics of nanotechnology).
42
Lemley, supra note 3, at 613–14; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 86.
43
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, A Technology Policy Perspective on the NIH Gene Patenting Controversy,
55 U. PITT. L. REV. 633, 648 (1994).
44
Sabety, supra note 2, at 504–05.
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government or other monies do not require the incentive of patent
exclusivity.45 Patenting on research already funded by the government also
violates the “reward theory” of patenting, by which patents serve primarily
to afford the opportunity to appropriate private returns on investments in
invention and innovation.46 Allowing patents on inventions that have been
funded through government-collected taxpayer funds also effectively
charges the public twice.47
Indeed, the type of research and development that governments are most
likely to fund ex ante are exactly those that the prospect of patent exclusivity
is unable to incentivize. Basic—or, “pure”—research, particularly in
complex and unpredictable fields such as biotechnology and
nanotechnology, is often thought to be too uncertain and distant in value to
be attractive as investments to private firms.48 Even when protected by
patents, the expected value of such basic research will be less than its
expected cost, and private firms will invest their resources in areas with more
certain returns.49 Because basic scientific and technological research has
great public value, however, governments step in and use public funds to
subsidize research that otherwise might never be funded.50
In the wake of the Bayh-Dole and the Stevenson-Wydler Acts, however,
university patenting on government-funded and other research increased
dramatically.51 Levels of university patenting increased by more than
eightfold between the late 1970s and the 1990s, with universities spending
almost six times as much on patenting in 2004 as they did in 1991, and this
upward trend continues to this day.52 How much of this increase in

45
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology
Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1666–67 (1996); Arti K. Rai &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Public Domain: Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 289, 300–01 (2003).
46
Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Comment, Patents, Prospects and Economic
Surplus: A Comment, 23 J.L. & ECON. 197, 198 (1980).
47
Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 1666; Michael S. Mireles, Adoption of the Bayh-Dole Act in
Developed Countries: Added Pressure for a Broad Research Exemption in the United States?, 59 ME. L.
REV. 259, 261 (2007); Jacob H. Rooksby, University Initiation of Patent Infringement Litigation, 10 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 623, 631 (2011).
48
Suzanne Scotchmer & Stephen M. Maurer, Innovation Today: Private-Public Partnership, in
SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 227, 230 (2004); Eisenberg, supra note 45, at
1695–96.
49
GEORGE S. FORD ET AL., PHOENIX CENTER FOR ADVANCED LEGAL & ECONOMIC PUBLIC POLICY
STUDIES, A VALLEY OF DEATH IN THE INNOVATION SEQUENCE: AN ECONOMIC INVESTIGATION 11
(2007); Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and
Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 352 (2000).
50
Scotchmer & Maurer, supra note 48, at 244, 246.
51
David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent Policy, 20 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 985, 989 (2005); Mireles, supra note 47, at 264.
52
ASS’N UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2014 (2016); Richard R.
Nelson, Observations on the Post-Bayh-Dole Rise of Patenting at American Universities, 26 J. TECH.
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university-based, upstream patenting is actually due to changes in the law is
unclear. Much of the increase in university-centered biomedical research
patenting occurred simultaneously with an increase in government funding
for such research,53 and the high proportion of university-owned patents that
we see in nanotechnology may likewise be due to the fact that government
funding continues to be one of the main drivers of research in the area.
Regardless of the reasons for the increase in university patenting of
upstream research, however, a number of commentators have expressed
grave doubts about the wisdom of such patenting patterns. Commentators
like Professor Lemley and others argue that the large volume of upstream,
university-owned patenting makes nanotechnology development uniquely
ripe for anticommons and other holdup problems.54 But are patents truly the
problem? Or is development in a science-based technology like
nanotechnology unavoidably slow for a variety of reasons that have little to
do with patenting at this point in time? The following two sections address
each of these explanations to show that upstream patents held by universities
and other government funding recipients likely have little to do with the slow
rate of nanotechnology development thus far.
II. LEMLEY’S STORY: THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS
Lemley and other commentators on nanotechnology development argue
that a combination of three patent-related factors have paradoxically slowed
progress in nanotechnology. First, liberalization of both patentable subject
matter restrictions and patentable utility standards in the 1980s and 1990s
paved the way for patenting on technology much earlier in the research and
development process.55 Second, because nanotechnology is a uniquely
cross-disciplinary field, the increase in upstream research patents may have
a particularly broad effect on downstream development.56 Third, enactment
of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 encouraged patenting of government-funded
research, resulting not only in a marked surge in upstream patenting but also
a new class of patent holders that lack either the expertise or the orientation
to license their patent effectively.57 The combined effect of these three
changes in patenting patterns is to create an anticommons, or
overparcelization of patent rights, that inflates transaction costs and hinders
TRANSFER 13, 13 (2001); Kristen Osenga, Rembrandts in the Research Lab: Why Universities Should
Take a Lesson from Big Business to Increase Innovation, 59 ME. L. REV. 407, 419 (2007).
53
David C. Mowery & Arvids A. Ziedonis, Academic Patents and Materials Transfer Agreements:
Substitutes or Complements?, 32 J. TECH. TRANSFER 157, 158 (2007). But see Eisenberg, supra note 45,
at 1702–05 (questioning whether pre-Bayh-Dole government patents were actually underutilized).
54
Lemley, supra note 3, at 620.
55
Id. at 613.
56
Id. at 614.
57
Id. at 617.
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downstream development. And as the first major technological field to
emerge since these changes, critics argue, nanotechnology development may
now suffer from the same tragedy of the anticommons and other holdup
problems that these changes may have caused in biotechnology as well.59
First, many commentators assert that nanotechnology has experienced a
high level of patenting on upstream, basic research due to relaxation of both
patentable subject matter and patentable utility standards, both of which
occurred around the same time in the early 1980s.60 According to the critics,
changes in the patentability of both basic research and federally-funded
research now allow universities to patent more of their nanotechnology
research and to patent it earlier in the research process than ever before. For
example, naturally occurring products, laws of nature, and abstract ideas
have long been held to be unpatentable subject matter.61 The Supreme
Court’s 1980 decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty62 is widely thought to
have relaxed these restrictions, however, by lowering the bar for what can
be deemed a patentable modification or “application” of a naturally
occurring product or law of nature.63 As a result, basic nanotechnology
research on previously unrecognized characteristics of substances at the
nanoscopic level have become more likely to be patentable with only minor
modifications over the substances’ naturally occurring forms.64 Similar case
law on the utility requirement, such as In re Brana,65 in addition to revisions
to the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO’s) 1995 Utility
Guidelines, also have loosened the utility requirements for so-called
research tools or research intermediates.66 As a result, much basic, upstream
research has now become patentable even though it typically requires a good
deal of further downstream investment and development to be incorporated
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Id. at 618.
See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons
in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998) (discussing the tragedy of the anticommons in
scientific research in biotechnology); Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 640 (same).
60
E.g., Lemley, supra note 3, at 613, 628; Simmons, supra note 22, at 783–85.
61
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); see also Mark Williamson & James
Carpenter, Traversing Art Rejections in Nanotechnology Patent Applications—No Small Task, 7
NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 131, 137–38 n.40 (2010) (citing cases).
62
447 U.S. at 303.
63
Id. at at 309 (declining to hold genetically modified bacteria to be unpatentable subject matter
simply because they are living organisms and because they derive from products of nature); Symposium,
G. Nagesh Rao, Note, Nanotechnology: A Look into the Future of Arising Legal Dilemmas, 17 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 835, 848 (2007); Tullis, supra note 12, at 287.
64
Simmons, supra note 22, at 785; Nicholas M. Zovko, Comment, Nanotechnology and the
Experimental Use Defense to Patent Infringement, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 129, 141,141 n.130 (2006).
65
51 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that patents do not have to reach FDA approval in
order to meet the utility requirement).
66
Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36, 263 (July 14, 1995).
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into usable end products with real-world utility. The creation of the United
States Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit in 1982 and its perceived propatent stance are alleged to have softened the various patentability
requirements, further intensifying upstream patenting in new fields such as
nanotechnology.68
The overall effect of these and other changes in the patent system has
led to early-stage research patents on “incomplete” inventions that have little
in the way of immediate application. By patenting incomplete inventions,
researchers leave much of the development work to others while reserving
to themselves the ability to charge downstream royalties or licensing fees,
effectively allowing upstream patentees to extract rents from downstream
developers. To make matters worse, the boundaries of upstream research
patents are also thought to be more vague. Because upstream research itself
tends to be more conceptual and abstract, it has the potential to cover broad
ranges of downstream developments, further enhancing its preemptive
effects.69
In a related vein, many commentators complain that nanotechnology
suffers from not only greater upstream patenting but also poorer patent
quality.70 In addition to common criticisms about the USPTO’s high
application backlog, high examiner turnover rates, and so on,71 any new field
such as nanotechnology presents obvious difficulties for the USPTO. New
technologies, particularly complex ones like nanotechnology, pose steep
learning curves for USPTO examiners, few of whom will have the necessary
expertise for evaluating nanotechnology patent applications.72 New
technologies obviously also lack the kind of robust prior art that exists in
more established fields, making it more challenging to identify inventions
that fail to meet the novelty or nonobviousness requirements.73 The fact that
many nanotechnological details are easily maintained as trade secrets means
that patenting likely does not reflect the total level of nanotechnology
innovation and, more importantly, does not adequately reflect the existing

67
David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of Innovation in
the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677, 1689–90 (2007); Reynolds, supra note 1, at 105.
68
E.g., Sabety, supra note 2, at 488 n.47; see also Dov Greenbaum, Academia to Industry
Technology Transfer: An Alternative to the Bayh-Dole System for Both Developed and Developing
Nations, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 311, 349 (2009) (noting that the Federal Circuit
has been “largely perceived as propatent”).
69
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 839, 884 (1990); Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical
Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 813, 839–40 (2001).
70
E.g., Bawa, supra note 3, at 717–18.
71
Id. at 724–27.
72
Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting,
1 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 121 (2001); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 59, at 699.
73
Akhtar, supra note 6, at 138; Bawa, supra note 3, at 707–09.
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level of applicable prior art in the field.
Moreover, even standardizing terminology can present challenges for
new technologies. The USPTO did not have a separate nanotech
classification until 2004, when it first established Class 977 for patent
applications in this field, and even then, the 977 category includes only
inventions that exploit those phenomena occurring at one hundred
nanometers or less.75 Because experts in nanotechnology argue that
characteristics occurring at up to three hundred nanometers in size should
also qualify as nanotechnology for regulatory purposes,76 977’s current
parameters may be too narrow to include all relevant nanotechnology
applications and prior art, particularly with regard to nanomedicine and
nanobiotechnology, which often lie outside of 977’s one hundred nanometer
size limit.77 And with high patenting levels and steep learning curves come
inevitable delays in examining and issuing patents; the backlog of nanotech
patent applications and their average pendency have both increased over the
years.78 The uncertainty caused by long patent pendencies can deter
downstream developers from entering a field for fear of infringing yetunissued patents.79
A second fact that concerns many commentators is nanotechnology’s
cross-disciplinary nature, a characteristic that may be unique to
nanotechnology. Nanotechnology is unusual in that it is defined solely by
size;80 the exact size limits on what constitutes nanotechnology are in
dispute,81 but any phenomenon that occurs at the nanoscopic level could be
argued to qualify as nanotechnology. Given the breadth of this definition,
nanotechnology has the potential to revolutionize any number of fields,
including biotechnology, electronics, energy, medicine, and materials
sciences.82 Nanotech is thus more size-specific than discipline-specific,
which creates some additional issues not seen in most fields. Relevant prior
74

Lemley, supra note 3, at 617.
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASS 977 NANOTECHNOLOGY CROSS-REFERENCE ART
COLLECTION, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/classification/class_977_nanotechnology_crossref_art_collection.jsp [https://perma.cc/SBQ3-G7RE] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016); see also Bawa, supra
note 3, at 706–07 (discussing the USPTO’s decision to establish the Class 977 category).
76
E.g., FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, OUT OF THE LABORATORY AND ON TO OUR PLATES:
NANOTECHNOLOGY IN FOOD & AGRICULTURE 3 (2008), http://www.foe.org/system/
storage/877/b5/4/547/Nanotechnology_in_food_and_agriculture_-_web_resolution.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2ZY2-W2U2]; Policy Memorandum from Miles V. McEvoy, Deputy Adm’r, U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., to Stakeholders & Other Interested Parties 1 (Mar. 24, 2015),
https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/NOP-PM-15-2-Nanotechnology.pdf
[https://perma.cc/87N8-W8ES].
77
Bawa, supra note 3, at 707.
78
Raj Bawa, Patents and Nanomedicine, 2 NANOMEDICINE 351, 358 (2007).
79
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 59, at 699; Shapiro, supra note 72, at 121.
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Bawa, supra note 3, at 704.
81
Id.
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Lemley, supra note 3, at 614.
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art becomes more difficult to identify and the appropriate skill level by
which to measure patentability becomes more difficult to define.83 More
importantly, nanotechnology’s cross-disciplinarity multiplies its potential
applications, giving patents in nanotechnology unusually broad effects in
many different areas of development.84 Those who work in downstream
nanotech development may need to negotiate licensing from patent holders
outside of their own fields and often may be caught infringing patents from
fields well outside of what they might reasonably have been expected to
review.85
The third factor on which Professor Lemley and others predicate their
nanotechnology anticommons argument is the Bayh-Dole Act.86 Before
Bayh-Dole took effect, universities and other government-funding recipients
had frequently been unable to patent their research, as government agencies
sometimes would not allow retention of intellectual property rights on
research funded through government grants.87 The Bayh-Dole Act
specifically changed these policies, not only to allow patenting but in fact to
promote patent ownership by the recipients of federal funds. Specifically,
the Bayh-Dole Act (formally, the Patent and Trademark Law Amendments
Act of 1980) set a policy for all federal agencies funding technological
research to encourage small businesses and nonprofit organizations such as
universities to retain title to their research by filing for patents on it.88 The
somewhat controversial justification for this change was to address the
perceived underutilization of government-funded research and to attract
private investment in developing and commercializing such research.89 The
post-Bayh-Dole era saw a marked increase in patenting on governmentfunded research in not only nanotechnology but also other research fields,
particularly biotechnology.90
One particular twist that Bayh-Dole adds to the mix, moreover, is the
concomitant growth in universities as patentees. Bayh-Dole has increased
university patenting by about sixteen fold,91 with estimates putting
83

Williamson & Carpenter, supra note 61, at 139–40.
Lemley, supra note 3, at 614–15.
85
Id.
86
Adelman, supra note 51, at 989.
87
Sabety, supra note 2, at 484–85.
88
35 U.S.C. § 202 (2012); see Eisenberg, supra note 45; Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit
Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF.
L. REV. 1503 (2012); Mireles, supra note 47, at 260.
89
Wei-Lin Wang, A Critical Study on the Cooperative Research and Development Agreements of
U.S. Federal Laboratories: Technology Commercialization and the Public Interest, 9 NANOTECH. L. &
BUS. 50, 53 (2012); Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 1669, 1680–82; Sabety, supra note 2, at 487–88.
90
David C. Mowery, The Bayh-Dole Act and High Technology Entrepreneurship in U.S.
Universities: Chicken, Egg, or Something Else?, in 16 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP,
INNOVATION & ECONOMIC GROWTH: UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
39, 51 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005).
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Bawa, supra note 3, at 722, 733–34; Lemley, supra note 3, at 615–16.
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university patenting at about 12% of all nanotechnology patenting and
20.2% of all biomedical nanotech patenting, levels far exceeding university
patenting of approximately 1% in other technologies.92 Universities do not
and cannot further commercialize their own research, however, and this
uncoupling between invention and commercialization means that
universities and private industry must incur the costs of finding and
transacting with one another in order for research to be developed into usable
end products.93
As a result, patent-licensing negotiations after Bayh-Dole now more
frequently involve unwonted partners in the form of academically oriented
universities transacting with commercially oriented firms. The transactions
necessary to develop research-based technologies have become not only
more numerous—because patents now exist where they had not before—but
also more complicated, because private industry must now negotiate with
universities in ways that they had not before. Universities are still disinclined
to view themselves as commercial entities, moreover,94 and even university
technology transfer offices (TTOs) do not have the market-based approaches
that private commercial entities do.95 Almost thirty-five years after BayhDole was enacted, universities are still unaccustomed to the commercial
world and lack the experience and expertise necessary for patent licensing.96
Universities also have very different internal authority structures than do
more commercial laboratories, and universities serve multiple different
constituencies whose often differing goals and agendas often prolong
licensing negotiations.97
According to Professor Lemley and other critics, the combination of
lowered patentability standards, cross-disciplinarity, and increases in
university patenting created a perfect storm of nanotechnology patents that
92

Lemley, supra note 3, at 615–16; Murray et al., supra note 6, at 31.
David Blumenthal et al., Relationships Between Academic Institutions and Industry in the Life
Sciences–An Industry Survey, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 368, 370 (1996); Osenga, supra note 52, at 421.
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Osenga, supra note 52, at 421.
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See Riccardo Fini & Nicola Lacetera, Different Yokes for Different Folks: Individual Preferences,
Institutional Logics, and the Commercialization of Academic Research, in 21 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY
OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: SPANNING BOUNDARIES AND
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Nicholas S. Argyres & Julia Porter Liebeskind, Privatizing the Intellectual Commons: Universities and
the Commercialization of Biotechnology, 35 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 427, 444 (1998).
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Celestine Chukumba & Richard Jensen, University, Invention, Entrepreneurship, and Start-Ups
13, 18–19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11475, 2005),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11475 [https://perma.cc/Q4NX-298Y]; Lay Leng Tan, Generating Dollars
from Nanotechnology, INNOVATION: THE SING. MAG. OF RES., TECH. & EDUC.,
http://www.innovationmagazine.com/innovation/volumes/v4n3/features4
[https://perma.cc/GVY2L3YS] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016); Interview with Marie Kerbeshian, Vice President of Tech.
Commercialization, Ind. U. Research & Tech. Corp. (Mar. 5, 2015).
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Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University
Inventions, 91 AMER. ECON. REV. 240, 244 (2001); Interview with Kerbeshian, supra note 96; see also
Blumenthal et al., supra note 93, at 370 (reporting university bureaucracy and regulations as the most
frequent obstacle to life science companies forming research relationships with universities).
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are not just numerous but also broad, overlapping, and fragmented in
ownership.98 Extrapolating from Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg’s
famous article on the tragedy of the anticommons in biomedical research,
Lemley posits that the explosion of university-owned upstream research
patents poses an even greater risk of an anticommons in nanotechnology as
well.99 Anticommons and other holdup problems occur when rights to a
particular piece of property are distributed among too many owners,
resulting in decreased use of those property rights because of the difficulties
of bringing all the rights holders to agreement on how to use their collective
property.100 In the case of technology, “overparcelization” of patent property
rights may similarly cause underdevelopment of a given technology.101 In
some cases, a patent may cover a component used only in combination with
one or more complementary components that themselves may be subject to
separate patent rights, requiring horizontal patent coordination to be used in
a productive way.102 In other cases upstream and downstream patent rights
cover “cumulative” technologies, in which separate patented technologies
must be vertically coordinated in order to create a single product or
process.103 The need for horizontal or vertical patent coordination could be
particularly likely in nanotechnology given that so many basic
nanotechnology tools and nanomaterials have been patented.104 Another
source of holdup problems are patent thickets, in which patent rights are
particularly dense because patents overlap with one another in scope.105 This
latter type of holdup problem is also thought to pose a particular risk to
nanotechnology development, where large numbers of potentially
overlapping patents cover multiple aspects and versions of materials like
carbon nanotubes and semiconducting nanocrystals.106 Because patents on
upstream nanotechnology already number in the thousands, with the rate of
98
Reynolds, supra note 1, at 83 (citing Nanotechnology Gold Rush Yields Crowded, Entangled
Patents, LUX RESEARCH INC.
(Apr. 21, 2005),
http://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/nanotechnology-gold-rush-yields-crowded-entangled-patents-54373177.html
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99
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100
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101
Id.
102
Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 740 (2012); see also
Michael Mattioli, Communities of Innovation, 106 NW. U.L. REV. 103, 113–14 (2012) (discussing
AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH
103–04 (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., Augustus. M. Kelley ed., 1971) (1838)). These types of
complementary technologies are sometimes referred to as Cournot complements. Mattioli, supra, at 123.
103
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1612–13
(2003); Richard R. Nelson, The Market Economy, and the Scientific Commons, 33 RES. POL’Y 455, 464
(2004); Shapiro, supra note 72, at 123.
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Lemley, supra note 3, at 613–14; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 86.
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Shapiro, supra note 72, at 119–20. But see Burk & Lemley, supra note 103, at 1627
(distinguishing patent thickets as occurring from the need to integrate multiple overlapping intellectual
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new patent applications accelerating over time, the risk of underuse and
obstruction due to anticommons or other hold ups could just grow worse.
In a Coasean world of zero transaction costs,107 however, even highly
balkanized patent rights could be easily overcome through bargaining and
exchange. Where parcelized patent rights are owned by the same entity in a
patent portfolio, for example, holdup problems are unlikely to occur. When
patent rights are distributed among multiple owners, however, transaction
costs become an issue, particularly when conflicting interests, rent-seeking,
strategic behavior, and cognitive biases frustrate agreement to use the
patents jointly.108 University ownership of patents as well as the potentially
cross-disciplinary relevance of those patents make transaction costs an even
greater concern in nanotech.
Again, university TTOs have different interests, expertise levels, and
governance structures than do the private industry actors with whom they
might negotiate licenses, a factor that can significantly exacerbate
transaction costs. Horizontal competitors with similar values and interests
will find it easier to come to formal or informal agreements, particularly if
repeated over time.109 Similarly situated private firms with patent portfolios
of similar value, for example, may face little difficulty in cross licensing
their portfolios. Universities obviously have very different interests and
incentives than private industry, however, and agreeing on terms for
licensing university patents is often a long and laborious process. These
types of conflicts are what this author has previously termed “qualitative,”
as opposed to a “quantitative” anticommons, in which, regardless of the
number of rights holders, the heterogeneity of transacting parties and the
divergence of their respective interests and incentives can multiply
transaction costs.110
Differences of opinion may hinder patent licensing in other ways as
well. Rights holders may attempt to hold out for a disproportionate share of
any joint rents, for example, knowing that their contribution is essential to
the success of the project.111 Universities in particular tend to overestimate
the value of their contributions to downstream development, as the academic
mindset typically places greater value on research than on
commercialization.112 Universities frequently demand reach-through
107
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Mark D. West & Emily M. Morris, The Tragedy of the Condominiums: Legal Responses to
Collective Action Problems After the Kobe Earthquake, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 903, 928 n.69 (2003); see
also Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116
YALE L.J. 1742, 1776 (2007) (noting heterogeneity of interests increases transaction costs); Heller &
Eisenberg, supra note 59, at 698 (same); MILLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 76 (same).
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licenses to downstream products as well, allowing them to extract an even
greater share of any returns from commercialization.113
The cross-industry applicability of basic nanotech inventions and
research also allows universities and other upstream patent holders to exert
unusually broad influence over downstream development in a wide number
of fields. Universities and even private industry may be able to influence
nanotechnology development not only in their own industries but also in
other industries as well. The cross-industry applicability of nanotech patents
thus raises the risk of both qualitative and quantitative anticommons, as the
number of parties needing to license nanotech patents, as well as the number
of nanotech patents themselves, increase with the number of industries
affected.114
Simply having to pay licensing fees or royalties for one or more
“upstream” patents reduces incentives to invest in downstream
development,115 and the more patents that must be licensed, the more that
royalties must be stacked, and the more that incentives to invest in
development are reduced.116 And where invention costs are low, such as
when invention costs are subsidized by the government, patents serve not so
much to spur technological development as to deter it.117 In these
circumstances, a fully competitive environment at the margins—i.e., one
without patent protections—would better foster downstream
development.118 Releasing government-funded university research into the
public domain, for example, would permit interested firms free access to the
research to commercialize it.119 For many technologies competition is more
effective than monopoly in spurring development; inventive concepts are
nonrivalrous, allowing every interested firm to try their hands at developing
downstream applications.120
Some of the concerns about nanotech patents have been tempered
already, however. For example, some critics suggest tightening the utility
and patentable subject matter standards to restrict patenting of upstream
research largely in reaction to the flood of biotechnology research patent
Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 629 (2008).
113
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A PATENT SYSTEM]; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 59, at 699; Osenga, supra note 52, at 427.
114
Cf. Mattioli, supra note 102, at 113–14 (discussing Cournot’s theory that the more rights that
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115
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323 (2002).
116
Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991,
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applications. The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in AMP v. Myriad122
and Mayo v. Prometheus123 have done exactly that, increasing the likelihood
that “discoveries” of naturally occurring materials or principles will be
found unpatentable.124 The courts and the USPTO similarly have tightened
the utility requirement to require “specific, substantial, and credible utility”
as more than just an object of further research.125 Moreover, the patent
system now also limits patentability by interpreting many patents in new
technologies rather narrowly through both the enablement requirement and
the written description requirement, the latter of which also is most often
applied to narrow university-held biotechnology patents.126 And regardless,
those who advocate for tightening patentability standards acknowledge that
more stringent requirements will not completely solve any anticommons
problem in nanotechnology, nor will it eliminate upstream research
patenting.127
Moreover, tightening patentability standards does little to address the
other issues that may predispose nanotechnology and other fields to holdup
problems with the increase in university patenting under Bayh-Dole.
Commentators have therefore proposed various mechanisms to diminish the
risk of anticommons and other obstacles. Some of these proposals, such as
resurrecting an experimental-use exception in patent law128 and resurrecting
121
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the reverse doctrine of equivalents, are designed to reduce transaction
costs by removing the need to license upstream patents. Other proposals,
such as less frequent injunctive relief,130 more accurate apportionment of
damages,131 and limitations on treble damages for willful infringement,132
seek to lessen the effect of royalty stacking by limiting infringement
remedies. A third proposal, specific to Bayh-Dole, calls for the use of a
funding agency’s “march-in” rights under the Act to grant, under certain
circumstances, what are effectively compulsory licenses that allow third
parties greater access to patented technologies.133 A similar proposal calls
for government agencies to invoke their rights under the Act to disallow
retention of patent rights by funding recipients in “exceptional
circumstances” where it “will better promote the policy and objectives” of
Bayh-Dole.134 Finally, private ordering may also help reduce transaction
Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United States Patent Infringement Liability: Implications
for University and Nonprofit Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917, 918 (2004); Katherine
J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV.
81, 99 (2004); Peter Lee, Note, Patents Paradigm Shifts, and Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 YALE
L.J. 659, 683–84 (2004). The only substantial experimental-use exception that currently exists in patent
law is the statutory exception limited to uses “reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary
biological products.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012).
129
E.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 103, at 1657–58; Dreyfuss, supra note 128, at 469. The reverse
doctrine of equivalents is an equitable doctrine that states that, even if an accused device falls within the
literal meaning of a patent claim, no infringement liability will be found if the accused device “so far
changed in principle from a patented article that it performs the same or a similar function in a
substantially different way.” Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1581
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod.
Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607, 608 (1950)).
130
E.g., Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 39, 102–20
(2008); Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (And One Not To), 48
B.C. L. REV. 149, 161, 166–67 (2007); Burk & Lemley, supra note 103, at 1665–68. But see F. Scott
Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 732–
36 (2001) (advocating for continued use of injunctive relief).
131
E.g., Lemley, supra note 130, at 165–66.
132
See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and University Technology
Transfer, in 16 UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 93, 113 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005); A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 113, at
108–09; Lemley, supra note 130, at 164–65; Lemley, supra note 3, at 630; see also Mireles, supra note
47, at 261 (discussing more robust research exemptions in the EU and Japan).
133
Specifically, a funding government agency may force a funding recipient to grant nonexclusive
or exclusive license to another under four circumstances: where the patentee is not expected to achieve
“practical application” of the patented invention within “reasonable time;” where necessary to address
health and safety needs; where necessary to meet requirements for public use specified under federal law;
or to make sure that any manufacturing is substantially domestic. 35 U.S.C. § 203 (a)(1)–(4) (2012);
Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don’t We Enforce Existing Drug Price Controls? The
Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed upon Patents Deriving in
Whole or in Part from Federally Funded Research, 75 TUL. L. REV. 631, 647 n.93, 648 (2001); Rai &
Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 294.
134
See e.g., Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 293, 303, 310 (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 202 (a)(i)–
(ii)); see also Tullis, supra note 12, at 306 (discussing possibility of compulsory licensing under agencies’
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costs. Universities can join with other patent holders to form patent
portfolios, patent pools, open-source pools, collective-rights organizations,
or research and development consortia, all of which can simplify the process
of gaining access to relevant patents.135
In the end, however, all of these proposals to fix patent holdup problems
in nanotechnology matter little if the seemingly slow development is not due
to patenting, as a closer look at the technology strongly suggests. The next
Section explores this possibility in more detail.
III. THE STORY OF SCIENCE-BASED TECHNOLOGIES: THE IRRELEVANCE OF
PATENTS
Contrary to Professor Lemley’s assertion, nanotechnology may not be
so different from other technologies that have also been affected by the
Bayh-Dole Act. Many of the concerns voiced about nanotechnology patents
are the same concerns that have been voiced about patents in other fields of
university research. Patent floods, for example, have been seen in other new
technologies such as molecular biology, superconductors, and petroleum
refining, where scientific breakthroughs suddenly spur a rush of new
opportunities.136 Patent floods, in turn, often breed poor patent quality, as the
sheer volume of new patent applications strains the USPTO’s resources and
low-quality and overlapping patents may lead to patent thickets.137 Indeed,
patent thickets have been cropping up since long before the Bayh-Dole Act
and the recent expansion of upstream research patenting by universities;
thickets were a well-recognized issue in the sewing machine war of the
1850s and in conflicts over airplane patents in the early 1900s, for
example.138 More recently, biotech has seen similar complaints about overly
broad patenting, poor patent quality, unpatentable subject matter, and high

§ 202(c)(4) right to “nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have
practiced for or on behalf of the United States any subject invention”) (citations omitted).
135
See Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science: Consideration-Based Regulation in
Patent Law, 58 EMORY L.J. 889, 915–16 (2009) (giving examples of patent pools and open-source
software); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (1996) (suggesting that the law should
allow “private collective rights organizations” to develop); Shapiro, supra note 72, at 119 (“Cross
licenses and patent pools are two natural and effective methods used by market participants to cut through
the patent thicket . . . .”); Lemley, supra note 3, at 623–27 (arguing that open licensing may be the solution
to patent floods); Rai, supra note 69, at 845–46 (“[P]roperly designed cross-licensing and patent pooling
arrangements can promote innovation markets.”).
136
Merges & Nelson, supra note 69, at 907–08; Meurer, supra note 115, at 319, 324–25.
137
Meurer, supra note 115, at 323–24; see also Adelman & DeAngelis supra note 67, at 1710–11
(noting backlog of patent applications in complex technologies such as biotechnology).
138
Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine
War of the 1850s, 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 165, passim (2011).
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patent clearance costs.
In these and other ways, nanotech appears to be fairly typical of sciencebased technologies, as this Section explains.140 There is therefore good
reason to believe that at least some of future downstream nanotech
development will follow in the footsteps of biotech development, where
upstream patenting has turned out to be largely irrelevant. Rather, there are
much more important obstacles than upstream patents to development in
science-based fields such as biotechnology and nanotechnology: long
development cycles; difficulties in attracting private investment; limited
access to materials and equipment; high dependence on tacit knowledge; the
low expected commercial values; multidisciplinarity; and likely regulatory
hurdles. Science-based fields arise from university research, but even when
present, access or lack of access to upstream university research patents
often takes a back seat to other more salient characteristics of such
technologies.
A. Anticommons Require More Than Upstream Patenting
As a first matter, the fact that universities hold such a high number of
early-stage nanotechnology research patents is not by itself sufficient to
cause either qualitative or quantitative holdup problems. Anticommons
require more than just a large volume of patents. Patents vary a great deal in
scope and importance,141 and of the small percentage that have commercial
value, few will be important enough to create obstacles. Rather, the effect of
a patent depends on a number of variables, and the effect of patenting under
the Bayh-Dole Act therefore will vary greatly across and even within
technologies and their developmental pathways.142
To see this point, we can compare nanotechnology to biotechnology. As
in nanotechnology, basic academic research and other government-funded
research have played a large role in the development of biotechnology.143
And like nanotech, biotech experienced a surge in university patenting after
Bayh-Dole; universities currently hold about 18% of all patents in genetics
139
See, e.g., MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY 65 (2008) (summarizing studies
suggesting overabundance and poor quality of biotechnology patents); Gary Pulsinelli, Share and Share
Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded Inventions Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI.
& TECH. 393, 438 n.280 (2006) (noting criticisms of USPTO’s evaluation of biotechnology patents).
140
See, e.g., Ulrich Schmoch & Axel Thielmann, Cyclical Long-Term Development of Complex
Technologies—Premature Expectations in Nanotechnology?, 21 RES. EVAL. 126, 126 (2012)
(characterizing nanotechnology as a “science-based complex technology”).
141
Adelman & DeAngelis, supra note 67, at 1682.
142
Brett M. Frischmann, Commercializing University Research Systems in Economic Perspectives:
A View from the Demand Side, in 16 UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:
PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 156–57 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005); Burk & Lemley,
supra note 103, at 1584–87; Merges & Nelson, supra note 69, at 843.
143
Bawa, supra note 3, at 722; Tullis, supra note 12, at 286–90.
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and molecular biology. In fact, some observers suggest that as a sciencebased field, nanotech now is following the same developmental trajectory
that biotech charted about fifteen to twenty years ago.145 The trends seen in
biotech can therefore be informative in studying development trends in
nanotech.
The empirical evidence thus far is equivocal at best as to whether the
increase in university patenting has in fact either impeded or aided
downstream development of university-based research as a whole,146 largely
because of the difficulties of testing such a hypothesis.147 In biotech,
however, the empirical data suggests that while anticommons and other
holdup effects have affected specific fields such as genetics,148 biotech more
generally does not suffer from significant holdup problems, whether
qualitative or quantitative.149 Some studies suggest that biotechnological
development and commercialization have in fact skyrocketed since the
1980s.150
The reasons for this surprising absence of evidence of holdup problems
in biotech are manifold.151 First, researchers, especially those in academia,
just ignore patents as a general rule.152 University researchers do not look at

144
Adelman, supra note 51, at 997 (although Adelman notes that biotech patenting levels overall
may be declining); Lee, supra note 135, at 939–40.
145
Frank T. Rothaermel & Marie Thursby, The Nanotech Versus the Biotech Revolution: Sources
of Productivity in Incumbent Firm Research, 36 RES. POL’Y 832, 842 (2007); Michael R. Darby & Lynne
G. Zucker, Grilichesian Breakthroughs: Inventions of Methods of Investing and Firm Entry in
Nanotechnology 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9825, 2003),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9825 [https://perma.cc/RP29-2Y59].
146
Osenga, supra note 52, at 410; Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont, Research Tool Patents
After Integra v. Merck–Have They Reached a Safe Harbor?, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 367,
387–88 (2008); Mireles, supra note 47, at 261, 274.
147
See Charles R. McManis & Sucheol Noh, The Impact of the Bayh-Dole Act on Genetic Research
and Development: Evaluating the Arguments and Empirical Evidence to Date, in PERSPECTIVES ON
COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION 435, 440, 475 (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes eds., 2012) (giving
examples of practical barriers to researching whether university patents inhibit innovation).
148
See, e.g., Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical
Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 8 (2003); Jon F. Merz et al., Letter to the
Editor, Industry Opposes Genomic Legislation, 20 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 657 (2002). But see
Andrew W. Torrance, Open Source Biotechnology: Open Source Human Evolution, 30 WASH. U.J.L. &
POL’Y 93, 123 (2009) (pointing out that empirical evidence of anticommons due to gene patenting is
scarce and that some empirical evidence in fact suggests the exact opposite).
149
See, e.g., John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical
Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 289, 331 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen
A. Merrill eds., 2003); Adelman, supra note 51, at 1023, 1028–29.
150
See Kieff, supra note 130, at 725–26.
151
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1063–75 (2008); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 Yale L.J. 177, 197–205
(1987).
152
Eisenberg, supra note 151, at 1076.
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patents in selecting their topics and conducting research, and many report
that they regularly use patented technologies in the belief that research is
exempted from liability under an experimental-use exception.154 Although
the Federal Circuit has held that no such experimental-use exception applies
even to university research,155 research patent infringement is often too
difficult to detect and police,156 particularly when it involves “problemspecific” rather than foundational research, and in any event it is unlikely to
be worth enough in damages to justify filing suit.157 Not surprisingly, patent
holders have been ill disposed toward suing academic infringers,158 but
universities may be reaching a point where they can no longer rely on
effective immunity from suit for infringement. Universities have
increasingly become the instigators and even targets of patent-enforcement
threats,159 and with the growing view of universities as commercial actors,
they have increasingly become the targets of patent enforcement as well.160
A second, more specific, and perhaps more important reason why
biotech has not experienced many hold ups is that biotech still offers so
many research and development prospects that neither those in academia nor
in private industry need bump into one another in order to research and
develop their own patch of biotech.161 As Professor David Adelman has
argued, the opportunities in biotech still far outnumber current research and
development capacity, such that those in the field still have plenty of
153
See, e.g., John P. Walsh et al., View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCI.
2002 (2005) (noting that only 5% of scientists surveyed regularly check for patents when conducting
research).
154
A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 113, at 72; Walsh et al., supra note 149, at 331.
155
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also A PATENT SYSTEM,
supra note 113, at 73, 76–77 (noting the effect of Madey).
156
Lemley, supra note 3, at 623; Mireles, supra note 47, at 275–76 (and sources cited therein).
157
Lemley, supra note 3, at 623; see also Victor H. Polk, Jr. & Roman Fayerberg, When Patented
Technologies Get Put to Experimental Use: Practical Considerations for Nanotech R&D, 8 NANOTECH.
L. & BUS. 152, 153–54 (2011) (noting that damage remedies may be muted, depending on the method of
infringement).
158
Walsh et al., supra note 149, at 326–27; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 59, at 700–01.
159
See Christopher Brown, Ayresian Technology, Schumpeterian Innovation, and the Bayh-Dole
Act, 43 J. ECON. ISSUES 477, 479 (2009) (“[U]niversities are heavily involved in patent litigation.”); A
PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 113, at 73, 76–77; Lemley, supra note 3, at 622; see also Mueller, Dilettante,
supra note 128, at 3–4 (describing Roche’s suit against more than forty U.S. universities and others for
alleged infringement of patents on the use of “Taq” and PCR).
160
See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2183 (2009)
(“[O]verpatenting by universities could lead to universities being treated more like commercial actors . .
. .”); Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, passim (2013); Mireles, supra note 47, at
275–76; Nelson, supra note 103, at 466. If the infringement occurs within public universities and research
institutions, however, the Supreme Court’s decision in Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Ed. Expense Bd.
v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) may provide sovereign immunity from suit. BUREAU OF
NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 28, 59–60 (Aline C. Flower
ed. 2d ed. 2014) [hereinafter BNA]; A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 113, at 78–79; Eisenberg, supra note
151, at 1092.
161
Adelman, supra note 51, at 998–99; Walsh et al., supra note 149, at 331–32.
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freedom to operate within the biotech field.
In those cases where
researchers were deterred by the cost of licensing upstream patents, the
researchers were easily able to redirect their research efforts to alternative
strategies, given that most subject matter offered a range of research
approaches.163 Similarly, patented processes and even research-method
patents can often be circumvented if other processes for achieving the same
result are available.164 Studies have shown that biotech firms and other
researchers will often invent around patented research or use other research
tools if any given project would require too many patent licenses.165 And
although biotech has also seen a surge in overall patenting and in upstream
patenting in particular,166 the concentration of patenting in any one subfield
of biotech remains small.167
Patent ownership also remains fairly diffuse, with no one entity able to
exert much control over the field and few barriers to patenting and entry by
newcomers.168 Diffuse patent ownership can lead to increased transaction
costs, but in the case of biotech, the number of patents that have to be
evaluated and negotiated for any given biotech project remains manageable
and is rarely reported as an obstruction.169
Without a similar mapping of nanotech-patenting patterns, it is difficult
to tell whether nanotechnology also provides wide range of research
avenues, but it seems likely. The youth of the field and its vast number of
subfields suggest that nanotech is still wide open for exploration without fear
of an anticommons.170 Again, the likelihood of upstream patenting deterring
downstream development is a question of how important those upstream
patents are. Much like biotech, nanotech is new enough and complex enough
that, even with the high levels of patenting on upstream research that
nanotech has already seen, many more research opportunities likely have yet

162

See Adelman & DeAngelis, supra note 67, at 1699.
Walsh et al., supra note 149, at 303; see also Adelman, supra note 51, at 1003–04 (noting that
most diseases offer more potential research targets than there are available researchers).
164
See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Limiting the Role of Patents in Technology, 5 J. NIH RES. 20, 22
(1993); see also A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 113, at 72 (noting that patents can be circumvented by
inventing around them, using substitute research tools, and locating research activity offshore).
165
Eisenberg, supra note 151, at 1064–65.
166
Adelman & DeAngelis, supra note 67, at 1687 (noting a decline in biotech patents issued as
utility standards and USPTO resources tightened).
167
Id. at 1701–02 (noting that most subclasses of biotechnology contained fewer than one hundred
patents).
168
Id.
169
Id. at 1697 (citing Walsh et al., supra note 149, at 299–304); A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note
113, at 72.
170
Cf. Adelman & DeAngelis, supra note 67, at 1698–1700 (explaining how biotechnology’s
relative youth continues to allow new avenues for exploration).
163
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to be identified.
Likewise, although many basic nanomaterials such as carbon nanotubes,
quantum dots, fullerenes, nanowires, dendrimers, and nanorods have been
patented,172 it seems likely that useful additions and alternatives to these
materials can be found in the near future. Organic nanotubes and polymer
nanotubes, for example, can serve as alternatives to carbon nanotubes for
many applications,173 and carbon nanotubes can be both synthesized and
purified through a wide variety of alternative methods.174 Nanoscopic
dendrimers also come in a huge variety of forms, including graphite-like
dendrimers, dendrimers with cross-linked surfaces, hyper-branched
dendrimers, and more.175 Most or all of these alternative nanotubes,
dendrimers, and processes have been patented (and therefore could create
patent thickets or other holdup issues),176 but their number and range
demonstrate the breadth of the field and suggest that in nanotech, as in
biotech, R&D opportunities far exceed capacity and that nanotech is thus
also “an effectively unbounded, uncongested common resource.”177
A few critical patents may be important enough, however, that despite
their relatively small number, restricted access to these patents could create
bottlenecks.178 Many technologies rely on a few pivotal research tools to
enable further research and development;179 without these foundational
inventions, further progress in their respective fields would be difficult or
impossible.180 Although very few upstream research patents fall within this
171
David E. Adelman, The Irrationality of Speculative Gene Patents, in 16 ADVANCES IN THE
STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION & ECONOMIC GROWTH: UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP
& TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 125 (Gary D. Libecap ed. 2005).
172
Lemley, supra note 3, at 613–14; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 86, 96.
173
Michael Lounsbury et al., The Politics of Neglect: Path Selection and Development in
Nanotechnology Innovation, in 21 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION &
ECONOMIC GROWTH: UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 51 (Gary D.
Libecap ed. 2010). The fact that carbon nanotubes have become the better-known form is more a matter
of “technological momentum” than importance to the field. Id.
174
M. Henry Heines, Carbon Nanotubes: Tracing Growth of a Young Technology Through Patents,
7 NANOTECHNOLOGY. L. & BUS. 21, 26–30 (2010) (“The impact of these synthesis patents is further
lessened by the existence of a variety of [carbon nanotube] synthesis methods, presenting the
manufacturer with a host of alternatives for avoiding infringement of a single patent.”).
175
Alexander Lee, Examining the Viability of Patent Pools for the Growing Nanotechnology Patent
Thicket, 3 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 317, 321–22 (2006).
176
See, e.g., id. at 323 (describing dendrimers as being subject to patent thickets).
177
Adelman, supra note 51, at 987; cf. id. (discussing why biotech has not suffered from
anticommons).
178
Walsh et al., supra note 149, at 305–06.
179
See, e.g., Lee, supra note 130, at 86–91.
180
Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89
MINN. L. REV. 917, 928, 932 (2005); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM.
L. REV. 257, 268–69 (2007); Lee, supra note 130, at 89–91. Foundational inventions have also been
referred to variously as “common-method research tools,” Adelman, supra note 171, at 139, “platform
technologies,” McManis & Noh, supra note 147, at 485, or even “Grilichesian breakthroughs,” Darby &
Zucker, supra note 145, at 1–2 (citing Zvi Griliches, Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of
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category, exclusive rights over foundational tools obviously can stifle
development and competition within a field.182 Evidence suggests that
foundational research tools are frequently dedicated to the public domain,
however.183
Although nanotubes and other nanomaterials have been referred to as
the “basic building blocks,”184 nanotechnology’s true foundational tool is
probe microscopy; without probe microscopy, nanotechnology could not
have become anything more than an interesting theory.185 Nobel Prizewinning physicist Richard Feynman first suggested the idea of manipulating
individual atoms in 1959, but it was not until the invention of the scanning
tunneling microscope in 1981 that scientists could actually visualize matter
at a high enough magnitude to begin to construct materials atom by atom.186
The scanning tunneling microscope was followed by the invention of the
atomic force microscope in 1989, which became commercially available
shortly thereafter and proved to be superior to the scanning tunneling
version.187 Subsequent iterations on probe microscopy have also yielded the
magnetic force microscope and the near-field scanning optical
microscope.188 Because nanotechnology could not exist without probe
microscopy, patent rights on these foundational research tools could pose a
risk to nanotech development.
According to Professor Lemley, nanotech is nevertheless different from
other pioneering technologies like computers, biotech, integrated circuits,
and lasers; although these fields experienced patent floods after Bayh-Dole,
Lemley claims that those patents covered mainly downstream applications
or improvements, not foundational technologies.189 Instead, according to
Lemley, the foundational tools in this latter group of technologies were
Technological Change, 25 ECONOMETRICA 501, 501 (1957)).
181
Adelman, supra note 51, at 1020; Adelman, supra note 171, at 139; McManis & Noh, supra
note 147, at 486.
182
Nelson, supra note 103, at 464.
183
Adelman, supra note 51, at 997–1001; Adelman, supra note 171, at 140; Walsh et al., supra
note 149, at 324–29.
184
Lemley, supra note 3, at 613–14; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 86.
185
See MONICA, supra note 2, § 1:1 (“Most important to the development of nanotechnology [were]
. . . entirely new forms of electron microscopes . . . .”); Zovko, supra note 64, at 156 (“[T]echniques such
as scanning probe microscopy are essential for manipulating atoms and arranging them in particular
molecular configurations . . . . If scanning probe microscopy, carbon nanotubes, or similar fundamental
tools are unavailable to research and development entities through purchase or license from patent
owners, the scientific progress of nanotechnology will be stifled.”); Darby & Zucker, supra note 145, at
13–14.
186
MONICA, supra note 2, § 1:1.
187
Cyrus M. Mody, Corporations, Universities, and Instrumental Communities: Commercializing
Probe Microscopy, 1981-1996, 47 TECH. & CULTURE 56, 68–69 (2006); Rothaermel & Thursby, supra
note 145, at 833, 835.
188
Mody, supra note 187, at 56, 57 n.1.
189
Lemley, supra note 3, at 613.
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unpatented, freely licensed, or tied up in interference proceedings and
litigation for so long that they were effectively unenforceable.190 In
nanotechnology, by contrast, patents cover all but a very few foundational
building blocks, making holdup problems much more likely than in previous
technologies.191
Again, however, whether nanotech is truly different from biotech or
other technologies is a matter for debate for a number of reasons. First, many
of the basic nanotech building blocks to which Lemley refers are not truly
pivotal, even though they may be basic. Again, carbon nanotubes and even
quantum dots, fullerenes, nanowires, dendrimers, and nanorods may be basic
in the sense that they can be incorporated into a vast variety of downstream
applications,192 but because meaningful substitutes likely can be found, these
materials may not pose as great a holdup risk as Lemley suggests.
Second, to the extent that its development has been stifled by patents on
foundational research tools like probe microscopy, nanotech is not as unique
as Lemley would suggest. Contrary to Lemley’s assertion otherwise, some
studies suggest that biotech research has in fact experienced holdup
effects.193 Although Cohen and Boyer liberally granted inexpensive,
nonexclusive licenses to their patented recombinant DNA technology, 194
foundational research tools such as Cetus Corporation’s polymerase chainreaction technology, Harvard’s OncoMouse, and the University of
Wisconsin’s human embryonic stem cell technology are thought to have
hampered progress in biotechnology because of the patent holders’
restrictive licensing practices.195 Thus, although foundational
nanotechnology research tools have been patented, it is likely that
development in this field is not significantly different from the other sciencebased technologies that have preceded it.
Third, even foundational technologies become less foundational as
190

Id. at 610–14.
Id. at 613–14.
192
Id.; see also Reynolds, supra note 1, at 86, 97 (“[N]anotechnology anticommons occurs at the
building block level . . . [where] patent holders will likely attempt to stack licenses on future downstream
discoveries.”).
193
Nelson, supra note 103, at 464.
194
MARYANN P. FELDMAN, ALESSANDRA COLAIANNI & CONNIE K. LIU, LESSONS FROM THE
COMMERCIALIZATION OF THE COHEN-BOYER PATENTS: THE STANFORD UNIVERSITY LICENSING
PROGRAM, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION:
A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES 1797, 1797–98 (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds., 2007),
http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/ch17/p22/ [https://perma.cc/M5U5-DR8S].
195
See Lee, supra note 130, at 93–96 (“Cetus threatened to aggressively enforce its patent against
firms engaged in pharmaceutical development, and even threatened suit against noncommercial,
academic researchers who shared their PCR-enabled research with industry. While Cetus did not follow
through with its threats, this example demonstrates the risks of strong exclusive rights on an
infrastructural resource subject to rapid and widespread adoption.”); Mowery, supra note 90, at 56;
Walsh et al., supra note 149, at 296–309.
191
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newly invented alternatives supplement or replace earlier technologies, as
illustrated by the multiple forms of probe microscopy that have become
available in nanotechnology.197 Although probe microscopes are not
perfectly interchangeable substitutes for one another, the progression from
scanning tunneling microscope to atomic force microscope and beyond does
at least illustrate the shift in technological bottlenecks over time.198
B. Obstacles to Development in Science-Based Technologies
Besides patents, nanotechnology faces a number of other, more
significant hurdles common in science-based technologies. “Science-based”
technologies such as biotechnology and nanotechnology, also known as
“research-based” technologies, derive not from practical experience in
industrial design and production but instead from the academic pursuit of
knowledge for the sake of knowledge, which may then only later have
practical application.199 As Professor Liza Vertinsky has explained, sciencebased technologies are “knowledge-intensive”200 and driven primarily by
basic research and scientific breakthroughs outside the norm of private
industry.201 And because inventions in science-based fields such as
nanotechnology are typically in no more than proof-of-concept form, they
are high in development costs and investment risk but low in expected
market value.202 Commercializing technologies still in such early and risky
stages of development is well beyond the comfort zone of most private
investors.203 The difficulties inherent to science-based technology
196
Kieff, supra note 130, at 730–31; cf. Mossoff, supra note 138, at 204 (noting that patent thickets
are contextual “depending on such things as time, available technology, and even commercial or legal
norms”).
197
See Mody, supra note 187, at 56, 57 n.1.
198
See Lee, supra note 130, at 74, 86–91 (discussing the “basic suite of infrastructural assets
necessary to invent in a given field shift[ing] as technology progresses”).
199
Nelson, supra note 103, at 457–59.
200
Liza Vertinsky, Universities as Guardians of Their Inventions, 4 UTAH L. REV. 1949, 1980
(2012).
201
Bawa, supra note 3, at 722; Merges & Nelson, supra note 69, at 880, 907–08 (explaining how
further innovation can become more “cumulative than science-based”); Mowery, supra note 90, at 42–
43 (and sources cited therein); see Heather Hamme Ramirez, Comment, Defending the Privatization of
Research Tools: An Examination of the “Tragedy of the Anticommons” in Biotechnology Research and
Development, 53 EMORY L.J. 359, 378 (2004) (“Compared to other industries, the biotechnology sector
is highly dependent on academic research . . . . [T]he private sector depends on universities for expanding
their research capabilities and expertise and for staying informed about important advances in science.”).
Nanotechnology pioneer K. Eric Drexler describes science-based technologies by distinguishing them
from engineering as curiosity-driven rather than results-driven. K. ERIC DREXLER, RADICAL
ABUNDANCE: HOW A REVOLUTION IN NANOTECHNOLOGY WILL CHANGE CIVILIZATION 105–10 (2013).
202
Mowery, supra note 90, at 42–43 (and sources cited therein); Chun Hsien Wang et al., A Study
of Nanotechnology R&D Alliance Networking, 2012 PROC. PICMET ‘12: TECH. MGMT. EMERGING
TECHS. 3497, passim (2012); Ramirez, supra note 201, at 378.
203
See Bawa, supra note 3, at 722.

528

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:499

development are thus much more likely than patents to slow development in
these embryonic fields, which are especially prone to suffer from
underdevelopment.204
Much of the early optimism about pioneering new technologies such as
biotech and nanotech and discussion about the effect of patenting in these
fields overlook the significant nonpatent obstacles, however, which can
often prove to be insurmountable.205 Very little of the research in these fields
and other government-funded research areas is even worth patenting,
presumably because of the same lack of commercial value that made it
dependent on government funding.206 Universities must be highly selective
in using their limited resources to patent faculty research, and university
TTOs usually will avoid the high costs of obtaining patent protection unless
industry expresses an interest in a particular technology.207 Even when
universities do decide to assume the cost of obtaining a patent, very few of
those patents earn any profit.208
Thus, although development of some of the more straightforward
nanotechnology applications may be less difficult, much if not most of the
field seems to be as yet in a more inchoate state, requiring many additional
developmental stages before commercialization can be achieved. Delays or
even failure can occur at any one of these stages for any number of reasons.
The following are some of the main reasons why much of nanotechnology
as science-based technology is so challenging to commercialize.

204
Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
1065, 1070–71 (2007).
205
Adelman, supra note 171, at 125.
206
Frischmann, supra note 142, at 155, 175; Walsh et al., supra note 149, at 309 (reporting that
only a minority of university-based inventions are patented, even in genetics).
207
See David S. Siegel & Phillip H. Phan, Analyzing the Effectiveness of University Technology
Transfer: Implications for Entrepreneurship Education 7 (Rensselaer Working Papers in Economics,
Number 0426, 2004), www.economics.rpi.edu/workingpapers/rpi0426.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5ZDR2RL] (noting that TTO and other research administrators “protect[] the university’s intellectual property
portfolio [and] . . . actively seek to market university-based technologies to companies and
entrepreneurs”); BNA, supra note 160, at 225, 227–32; McManis & Noh, supra note 147, at 454;
Interview with Kerbeshian, supra note 96. University TTOs often opt to file much less expensive
provisional patent applications, but these expire after twelve months unless a fuller and more expensive
nonprovisional application is filled. Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights:
Putting Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 247 (2006).
208
Brian J. Love, Do University Patents Pay Off? Evidence from a Survey of University Inventors
in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 285, 308–12 (2014) (finding
that life science patents are at least more likely to be profitable than other high tech patents); Scotchmer
& Maurer, supra note 48, at 235; Bagley, supra note 207, at 259; see also Greenbaum, supra note 68, at
359–60 (“[W]hile some licenses may be a boon for universities and some academic inventors, the
majority of income derived from licensing of academic innovation nationwide comes out of a handful of
licensing offices, most of which predated Bayh-Dole, and even those take relatively little revenue home
relative to the costs necessary to generate those innovations.”).
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1. Long Development Cycles
First and most significant is the fact that commercializing science-based
technologies requires a good deal of further experimentation and work;
regardless of patent burdens, it is simply a laborious and slow process to
develop basic research and “bridge the gap from the laboratory to the
marketplace.”209 Science-based technologies often explore pioneering new
areas well outside existing art but consequently require far more downstream
development than other technologies.210 Having been invented by scientists
rather than business people, emerging technologies do not come out of the
laboratory in ready-to-market form,211 and even patentable inventions in
these fields typically require several additional stages of development. 212
Taking research-intensive technologies from laboratory proofs of concept to
industrial practice necessitates perfecting the invention so that it will
perform reliably and can be reproduced in a cost-efficient manner.213 For
example, producing even basic nanotechnology building blocks such as
nanotubes, metal oxide nanoparticles, and fullerenes in consistently highquality form, took quite some time.214 Each of these additional steps may
also be complex and time-consuming, making overall commercialization
quite lengthy. Long development cycles and time lags are therefore common
in research-intensive fields such as physics, mathematics, and the physical
sciences,215 and nanotechnology has proven to be no exception, with long
209
Thomas A. Kalil, Nanotechnology and the “Valley of Death,” 2 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 265,
26566 (2005) (quoting Nanotechnology Research and Development Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 766
Before the H. Comm. on Sci., 108th Cong. 57–58 (2003) (Statement of Alan Marty, Executive-inResidence of JP Morgan Partners and Advisory Board Member of Nanobusiness Alliance); accord
Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories About the Benefits and Costs of Patents,
32 J. ECON. ISSUES 1031, 1048 (1998); Mowery, supra note 90, at 43; Schmoch & Thielmann, supra
note 140, at 126.
210
Bawa, supra note 3, at 719; Mowery, supra note 90, at 42–43; Wang et al., supra note 202,
passim.
211
Stuart J.H. Graham & Maurizio Iacopetta, Nanotechnology and the Emergence of a General
Purpose Technology, 115/116 ANNALS ECON. & STAT. 5, 8 (2014).
212
Mowery, supra note 90, at 44–45 (and sources cited therein); Merges & Nelson, supra note 69,
at 880, 907–08; Nelson, supra note 103, at 457–59; see also Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby,
University Licensing and the Bayh-Dole Act, 301 SCI. 1052, 1052 (2003) (citing survey evidence that
45% of university inventions are simply “proof[s] of concept”).
213
See Philip E. Auerswald & Lewis M. Branscomb, Valleys of Death and Darwinian Seas:
Financing the Invention to Innovation Transition in the United States, 28 J. TECH. TRANSFER 227, 229,
229 fig.2 (2003) (outlining a sequential model of development and funding); Kalil, supra note 209, at
265–66 (discussing the time and investment required to move a product from the “laboratory to the
marketplace”) (quoting Nanotechnology Research and Development Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 766
Before the H. Comm. On Sci., 108th Cong. 57–58 (2003) (statement of Alan Marty, Executive-inResidence of JP Morgan Partners and Advisory Board Member of Nanobusiness Alliance).
214
Lane & Kalil, supra note 28, at 52.
215
DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITYINDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED STATES
30 (2004); Mowery, supra note 90, at 43.
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development spans frequently delaying commercialization.
Commercializing research-based
technologies often entails
development of new equipment and new materials as well. Translating
scientific knowledge into industrial application generally involves
implementation through one of the applied sciences such as engineering,
information technology, or materials science.217 The more pioneering these
technologies are and the more widespread their effects, the more their
successful commercialization will depend on separate scientific and
technological developments in infrastructure such as machinery and
processes, as well as correlative technologies such as supporting software
and information technology.218 In nanotechnology, for example, the need to
develop secondary equipment and processes may be particularly acute,
given the cross-disciplinary nature of nanotechnology and the need to adapt
it to specific sectors.219
The technological translation process may also depend on the cost and
availability of existing material assets and machinery.220 Probe microscopy
development, for example, has been heavily influenced by what materials
were cheaply and easily available at the time.221 When academic researchers
were working on improving the STM for their own uses, they opted for
graphite because it happened to be cheaply available as waste material from
United Carbide.222 Similar material availability issues also shaped the
divergent development efforts by STM researchers working in different
locations.223 And even now, lack of access to high quality and reliably
reproducible and manufacturable nanomaterials continues to be a stumbling

216

Bawa, supra note 3, at 719; Festel et al., supra note 20, at 55; Lane & Kalil, supra note 28, at
50, 52; Rasmus Davidsen, Nanotechnology Startups: Not the Usual Growth Pattern, DAFTBLOGGER
EJOURNAL (June 15, 2013, 6:36 PM), http://www.daftblogger.com/nanotechnology-startups-not-theusual-growth-pattern/ [https://perma.cc/Z3DX-64YA].
217
Merges & Nelson, supra note 69, at 880; see also Mowery, supra note 90, at 43.
218
Abramowicz, supra note 204, at 1071; Auerswald & Branscomb, supra note 213, at 230; Graham
& Iacopetta, supra note 211, at 12; Schmoch & Thielmann, supra note 140, at 127. Of course, where the
development of auxiliary technologies depends on access to the upstream technologies to which they are
complementary, hold up due to patents on those upstream technologies can further exacerbate overall
developmental delays. See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative
Innovation, 26. RAND J. OF ECON. 34, 34 (1995). It is in the patentees’ best interests, however, to license
their upstream patents liberally where the value of their upstream technologies in turn depends on the
development of complementary technologies. Id at 52.
219
See Graham & Iacopetta, supra note 211, at 8–9 (noting that nanotechnology’s success as a
“general purpose technology” depends on the development of related technologies).
220
See Lee, supra note 175, at 323 (explaining that the number of nanotechnology applications
currently considered commercially viable is small because of the cost of producing even small quantities
of dendritic molecules).
221
Mody, supra note 187, at 65–66.
222
Id.
223
Id.
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block for nanotech development
because materials such as carbon
nanotubes and dendritic molecules are rate-limitingly expensive and
difficult to find in sufficiently high quantities and quality.225 Access to
materials or research materials can be restrictive in other fields as well; for
example, in biofuels the production cost of enzymes and ethanologens is a
significant barrier to research.226 Similarly, the fixed capital costs of
retooling or buying new machinery can be prohibitively burdensome.227
Nanotechnology depends on access to probe microscopes, nanofabrication
equipment, modeling software, and other essential but often proscriptively
costly tools.228 For example, faster drying, more efficient autobody
nanocoatings have been available for some time now, but the cost of
retooling has kept the cash-strapped automobile industry from taking
advantage of the new technology.229
Given the extreme length of development cycles in science-based
technologies, then, those engaged in the commercialization process often
simply ignore potential clashes with the patent rights of others, and
rationally so.230 Even when they receive cease-and-desist letters threatening
legal action for patent infringement, emerging technology developers know
that litigation to enforce patent rights is often more costly than it is worth.231
In addition, patent holders usually will refrain from filing suit until an
infringing development project produces something of enough commercial
value to warrant the bother, but given the high failure rates in researchintensive technologies, threatening patent holders seldom actually file.232
Litigation always poses a risk for the patent holders as well, as even the
strongest patents may be subject to invalidation in whole or in part.233 And
if the critics are correct, filing infringement suits in science-based
technologies may be particularly fraught with danger, as upstream patents
224
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 7–8, 31, 38–40 (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2010) [hereinafter NRC]; Lane
& Kalil, supra note 28.
225
Lee, supra note 175, at 323 (“[T]here are only a handful of [nanotechnology] applications and
discoveries that are currently considered commercially viable and worth pursuing due to the very high
cost of producing even small quantities of dendritic molecules.”); MONICA, supra note 2, § 1:10.
226
Daniel R. Cahoy & Leland Glenna, Private Ordering and Public Energy Innovation Policy, 36
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 415, 448–49 (2009).
227
Wolfe, supra note 37; see also Graham & Iacopetta, supra note 211, at 8–9 (noting that the
“general purpose technologies,” potentially including nanotechnology, often experience slow-downs as
existing equipment is replaced with relevant new equipment).
228
MILLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 189; Graham & Iacopetta, supra note 211, at 12.
229
Wolfe, supra note 37.
230
Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 20–22 (2008); Walsh et al.,
supra note 149, at 327.
231
Lemley, supra note 230, at 22; Lemley, supra note 3, at 623; Polk & Fayerberg, supra note 157,
at 153–54; Walsh et al., supra note 149, at 327.
232
Lemley, supra note 230, at 22.
233
See id. at 27 (noting that as many as three-fourths of litigated patents are found invalid or not
infringed); Walsh et al., supra note 149, at 328.
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are particularly vulnerable to invalidation for lack of specific and substantial
utility, failure to claim patentable subject matter, and, especially in
nanotechnology, inherency or obviousness.234
Finally, development cycles may also span so many years that patents
on foundational or other potentially blocking upstream research inputs often
will expire in the interim.235 Patents on many of the basic nanotech building
blocks, such as those on carbon nanotubes, buckyballs, quantum dots,
dendrimers, and nanorods, for example, have already expired or are due to
expire in the very near future,236 and foundational inventions in particular
may be used through several development cycles, such that their patents
expire long before their utility does.237 Thus, by the time science-based
technologies finally achieve commercialization, many patents will no longer
be in effect.238 As a result, upstream patenting’s capacity to exert holdup
effects is rather low in these technologies.
2. The Valley of Death
The technological difficulties of commercializing science-based
technologies bring economic difficulties as well. Again, commercialization
of research-intensive technologies is usually an expensive, risky, multistage
undertaking. The government will invest in the basic research stages, but
private investors prefer to wait and invest only in the very last stages of
development; private firms and investors generally favor development
projects closer to completion so as to minimize risk and maximize the timevalue of their funds.239 The long, expensive, and uncertain development
stages in between the early, basic research stage and the final, marketing
stage are consequently left to languish for lack of investment.240 Indeed,
many scholars note that it is government funding of basic research that
“causes” the valley of death because the government tends to subsidize
exactly the kind of basic research in which private industry is unwilling to
234
HELLER, supra note 139, at 65; Akhtar, supra note 6, at 138; Bawa, supra note 3, at 707–10;
Pulsinelli, supra note 139, at 438 n.280 ; Williamson & Carpenter, supra note 61, at 139–40.
235
Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 366 (2010); Adelman, supra
note 51, at 1015–16.
236
Sharrott & Gupta, supra note 4, at 159–60.
237
Adelman, supra note 51, at 1015–16; Sichelman, supra note 235, at 366.
238
To see the inverse relationship between development cycle length and the risk of patent-related
hold ups, contrast biotech and nanotech with the software industry, where development cycles are so
short that new software may run afoul of patents still covering previous generations of software. Burk &
Lemley, supra note 103, at 1622–23.
239
Allen, supra note 2; Frischmann, supra note 142, at 172; FORD ET AL., supra note 49, at 4.
240
Auerswald & Branscomb, supra note 183, at 232; FORD ET AL., supra note 49, at 10; Kalil, supra
note 209, at 265–66. Private investors’ willingness to invest in intermediate-stage commercialization has
apparently varied somewhat over the years, however. Auerswald & Branscomb, supra note 213, at 231;
T. Randolph Beard et al., A Valley of Death in the Innovation Sequence: An Economic Investigation, 18
RES. EVALUATION 343, 350–51 (2009).
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assume the risk. Development of many otherwise valuable science-based
inventions never attain commercialization because of lack of funding for the
intermediate stages of development in what has been termed the “Valley of
Death.”242
Private investors are reluctant to fund the intermediate stages of
technology development for a variety of reasons, many of which are the
same reasons that they do not invest in early-stage, basic research. Other
things being equal, the more rapidly an investment yields returns the more
likely investors are to invest, but research-intensive technologies do not lead
to the kind of rapid innovation that can yield the immediate returns that
investors want.243 Instead, science-based technologies still in the early and
even intermediate stages of development take too many years to yield
returns, if they in fact yield any returns at all.244 Much of the current
development in nanotechnology, for example, commonly requires twice the
time needed for commercialization in other venture-capital supported
technologies245 and is well beyond the accepted investment timetables of
private industry.246 Plus, the longer the development cycle, the more costly
it is likely to be, making development even more unattractive as an
investment.247
And it is not just the length of development cycles but also the
uncertainty and risk inherent in science-based technologies that deter
investment in the intermediate stages of development. Commercialization of
basic research is a painstaking process of trial and error,248 and universityinitiated inventions in particular experience higher failure rates than private
firm-initiated inventions, with up to half of university inventions failing
during commercialization.249 In addition to the technological uncertainties
241
See, e.g., Beard et al., supra note 240, at 344; see generally FORD ET AL., supra note 49, at 12–
14 (providing an explanation and conceptualization of the “valley” in order to find out why it exists in
the first place).
242
The chronic underfunding of intermediate technological development has also been referred to
as the “Darwinian seas” or “innovation gap.” Auerswald & Branscomb, supra note 213, at 231. It has
also been called the “funding gap.” Beard et al., supra note 240, at 343.
243
Abramowicz, supra note 204, at 1097.
244
Auerswald & Branscomb, supra note 213, at 232.
245
Schmoch & Thielmann, supra note 140, at 134; Allen, supra note 2; see also Wolfe, supra note
37 (explaining that development in nanotechnology start-ups average seven years from inception to
market). But see Rothaermel & Thursby, supra note 145, at 846 (surmising, on the other hand, that
nanotechnology development cycles are half as long as those typical of biotechnology).
246
Lane & Kalil, supra note 28, at 52; see also Beard et al., supra note 240, at 345 n.3 (citing a
Department of Energy report that venture capitalists, as a rule, expect a ten-time return on investments
within five years).
247
Abramowicz, supra note 204, at 1093.
248
Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 209, at 1048.
249
Emmanuel Dechenaux et al., Appropriability and Commercialization: Evidence from MIT
Inventions, 54 MGMT. SCI. 893, 894 (2008); Frank T. Rothaermel & Marie Thursby, Incubator Firm
Failure or Graduation? The Role of University Linkages, 34 RES. POL’Y 1076, 1078 (2005); see also
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already mentioned, commercializing science-based inventions also involves
the business uncertainties of defining markets and market demand. 250
Technological difficulties account for only about half of the failure rate
among university inventions, with the remainder failing due to the business
difficulties of identifying market opportunities for university inventions
whose ultimate applications so frequently differ from what was expected
during the early stages of commercialization.251 Nanotechnology again has
proven to be no exception, with both technological and marketing
difficulties leading to high failure rates during commercialization efforts.252
Considering the time and expense involved and their minimal capacity
even to assess risk, investors are understandably risk averse. The
information gaps between inventing research scientists and investors are
significant,253 and few private investors can afford the fixed capital costs of
acquiring the expertise necessary to assess the risks.254 The intermediate
stages of development are thus in many ways the most critical because they
are the stages that resolve much of the technological and business
uncertainty of commercialization.255 Only once intermediate-stage
development is complete, these uncertainties resolved, and a valid
commercial plan proven are private investors willing to become involved.256
In this way the valley of death and the information gap between private
interests and university researchers can create greater obstacles to
downstream development than patents do. The difficulties of attracting
investment in technologies with long and uncertain development cycles are
often a more intractable problem than is the need to license upstream or
complementary patents. As a matter of fact, identifying downstream firms
to develop university research is one of the most difficult obstacles for
technology transfer offices to overcome.257
Some private investors such as angel and seed investors specialize in
early- and intermediate-stage development, however.258 Indeed, a few angel
Thursby & Thursby, supra note 212, at 1052 (additional citations omitted) (citing evidence that university
inventions have 72% failure rate for proof-of-concept inventions).
250
Auerswald & Branscomb, supra note 213, at 229; Dechenaux et al., supra note 249, at 894;
Kalil, supra note 209, at 26566.
251
Dechenaux et al., supra note 249, at 894.
252
Allen, supra note 2; Wang et al., supra note 202, at 3498.
253
Auerswald & Branscomb, supra note 213, at 230; Graham & Iacopetta, supra note 211, at 89;
Atul Nerkar & Scott Shane, Determinants of Invention Commercialization: An Empirical Examination
of Academically Sourced Inventions, 28 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1155 (2007); Scott Shane, Selling
University Technology: Patterns from MIT, 48 MGMT. SCI. 122, 123 (2002); Charles W. Wessner,
Driving Innovations Across the Valley of Death, 48 RES. TECH. MGMT. 9, 9 (2005).
254
FORD ET AL., supra note 49, at 3334.
255
Auerswald & Branscomb, supra note 213, at 22930; FORD ET AL., supra note 49, at 10; Kalil,
supra note 209, at 26566.
256
Abramowicz, supra note 204, at 1071; Auerswald & Branscomb, supra note 213, at 229.
257
Osenga, supra note 52, at 421.
258
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investment companies, such as the Nano Business Angels network and the
Central Coast Angel Network, have come to specialize in nanotech
specifically.259 Over time other venture capitalists and other potential
investors will become less reluctant to invest in new technologies such as
nanotechnology as investors develop expertise in and a level of comfort with
the technologies and the technologies themselves mature, such that the
perceived risk of investment attenuates.260 Venture capital’s interests in
nanotechnology, for example, have waxed and waned over the years,261 and
venture capitalists have constituted only a small minority of overall funding
of nanotechnology research for the past couple of decades.262 Only once
revenue streams from nanotechnology-based products finally began to grow
in recent years did private industry funding for nanotechnology R&D finally
begin to overtake government funding.263
Because of private capital’s wariness of emerging technologies,
development projects that are too uncertain and risky to attract private
funding can obtain government funding from several federal agencies.264
The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program enacted in 1982,
for example, allows federal agencies to grant funds to small businesses for
the commercialization of government-sponsored R&D.265 A number of
agencies that fund nanotechnology basic research also issue SBIR grants,
and the National Institutes of Health have even implemented a
Bioengineering Nanotechnology Initiative to grant SBIR funds for
biomedical nanotech projects.266 The Small Business Technology Transfer
(STTR) subpart of SBIR also funds collaborations between private industry
and nonprofit educational and research facilities.267 In the late 1980s,
Congress also created the Advanced Technology Program (ATP) to provide
matching funds for private investments in early-stage technological
developments that face significant risk but are likely to yield significant and
wide-ranging benefits.268 Overall, government funding steps in to provide
259
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about 20% to 25% of all funds for early-stage technology development,269
with state governments also increasingly providing public funds for the same
purposes, such as funding university start-ups.270 Nanotechnology
companies can also apply for Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
grants for high-risk projects that offer advances in military preparedness.271
3. Limitations on Equipment and Materials
Furthermore, constraints on access to the necessary tools and materials
as well as skills raise imitation costs in a way that makes patent protections
largely inconsequential and even unnecessary in science-based
technologies.272 Private control over relevant research facilities and
materials, for example, create nonpatent exclusivities affecting downstream
development. Not just industry but also universities are often perceived as
being quite proprietary over their materials and instruments, particularly
biotech materials, and frequently do not allow the public free access to their
research materials and tools.273 In point of fact, a survey of biotech
researchers documents that the need to negotiate access to necessary
materials such as cell lines was a more limiting factor than upstream
patents.274 And even when they do agree to share materials and equipment,
universities often employ materials-transfer agreements that include reachthrough royalty provisions or other restrictive conditions such as limits
patenting to downstream products.275
Of course, proprietary university policies on sharing research materials
may be a part of an overall shift toward less liberal sharing caused by BayhDole’s emphasis on university ownership of their research. Universities may
feel that they need to be more protective of their research materials and tools
as a way of simultaneously protecting their research patents,276 for instance,
or universities may be forced to be more possessive of their materials
because of the restrictions imposed under industry-sponsored research
269
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agreements relying on the expectation of university patent ownership under
Bayh-Dole.277 On the other hand, universities may be protective simply
because producing research materials and tools requires effort and
investment and because those materials and tools help universities establish
a competitive edge as leading research institutions.278 Regardless of the
motivation, however, the fact stands that exclusive access to research
materials and tools is a more significant problem in technology
commercialization efforts than patents are.279
One method that has been used to address the holdup problems created
by the need for research materials is to standardize materials-transfer
agreements, at least as between equally situated research institutions such as
universities, as proposed by the NIH and endorsed by the AUTM for use in
the transfer of biotechnology research materials.280 This effort fell somewhat
flat, however, as universities often may continue to place their economic
self-interest over Mertonian norms and social welfare.281
Universities have, however, begun to set up technology incubators and
research and science parks to house both university- and industry-based
start-ups; to facilitate closer relationships between universities and private
industry for joint projects, consultation, and other endeavors; and to provide
access to research materials and tools.282 Industry- and university-based
“precompetitive” research and development consortia have also recently
evolved to share research and development resources, such as research tools,

277
BNA, supra note 160, at 241; James Flanigan, Collaborating for Profits in Nanotechnology,
N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2009, at B6; Arti K. Rai, Proprietary Rights and Collective Action: The Case of
Biotechnology Research with Low Commercial Value 4 (Duke L. Sch. Legal Stud., Research Paper No.
59, 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=568521 [https://perma.cc/UT6Y-YX9P] (noting also a significant
increase in proprietary rights over upstream materials in biotechnology research over the past two
decades).
278
Walsh et al., supra note 149, at 320 (noting that universities themselves rank commercial
concerns at the bottom of the list of reasons for their proprietary attitudes toward research materials and
tools).
279
Eisenberg, supra note 151, at 1062; cf. Greenbaum, supra note 68, at 363 (noting that materials
transfer agreements are not subject to the same exceptions that patent and copyright rights are). But see
Mowery & Ziedonis, supra note 53, at 157 (finding evidence that materials transfer agreements do not
hinder commercialization of university research).
280
Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement: Discussion of Public Comments Received;
Publication of the Final Format of the Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 12,771 (Mar. 8, 1995); Arti K. Rai,
Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U.L. REV.
77, 113 nn.201–04 (1999); Lee, supra note 135, at 925.
281
Rai, supra note 277, at 13; Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 289, 305–06.
282
Matthew M. Mars & Sherry Hoskinson, The Organizational Workshop: A Conceptual
Exploration of the Boundary Spanning Role of University Entrepreneurship and Innovation Centers, in
ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: SPANNING
BOUNDARIES AND DISCIPLINES: UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION IN THE IDEA AGE,
supra note 95, at 120; BNA, supra note 160, at 266–67; Rothaermel & Thursby, supra note 249, at 1076–
77; Siegel & Phan, supra note 207.

538

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:499

283

materials, and even data. These precompetitive consortia are probably the
most effective means of providing public access to otherwise proprietary
materials, as the consortia allow multiple downstream developers to share
foundational resources. Such precompetitive consortia are difficult to
organize, however, and face steep transaction costs that may require
governmental intervention, or changes in relevant law, to overcome.284
4. Tacit Knowledge
Moreover, limited access to research materials and tools is not the only
type of nonpatent exclusivity that can obstruct downstream development.
Another form of effective exclusivity is tacit knowledge, a phenomenon
common in fields such as biotechnology and nanotechnology, where
university research can lead to such major advances over the prior art that
learning curves become too steep for others in the field to be able to acquire
the necessary expertise.285 As a result, the knowledge and skills necessary
for downstream development in the field remain concentrated in the hands
of just a few researchers and impose an unavoidable limit on downstream
development that often eclipses other types of exclusivity, including both
patent protection and first-mover advantages.286
First, commercialization of most university research, whether or not
patented, requires the participation of the inventing researcher. Estimates
indicate that somewhere between 40% and 71% of licensed university
research requires faculty involvement to be successfully commercialized.287
Even genetics remained dependent on tacit knowledge for decades after
Cohen & Boyer’s seminal invention of recombinant DNA technology. 288
Nanotechnology also remains highly knowledge-intensive, such that success
in the field is limited to firms with access to researchers with the requisite
specialized skills in the area.289
283
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For example, tacit knowledge was a significant factor in the
development of the scanning tunneling microscope and the atomic force
microscope, two of the foundational research tools through which the entire
field of nanotechnology even became possible.290 Invented by IBM
employees Heini Rohrer and Gerd Binnig in 1979, the STM was at first a
commercially valueless dud in which IBM lost interest.291 Rohrer and Binnig
did not want their brainchild to fall into oblivion, however, so they cultivated
a select few academic researchers from a variety of disciplines who were
interested in using the STM for basic research.292 This core group of STM
enthusiasts struggled for years to acquire enough of Binnig and Rohrer’s
expertise to replicate the microscope.293 Only once a critical mass of
enthusiasts finally had the expertise to construct STMs on their own and to
spark the interests of their home institutions in the research benefits of these
new devices did IBM decide to begin commercial STM production in the
late 1980s.294 Even then, for the first five years or so after they were
invented, scanning tunneling and atomic-force microscopes were accessible
only to those with the resources and skills necessary to construct the
microscopes on their own.295 Moreover, the facilities that invested in STMs
still had to train someone to use the microscopes, given that the simple act
of using an STM continued to require some degree of expertise and tacit
knowledge for decades.296
Second, faculty involvement is often crucial to locating licensees for
university research. A researcher’s tacit knowledge can be important to
bridging the information gaps between investors and researchers that
contribute to valley-of-death issues and can help to inspire investor
confidence by establishing a researcher’s reputation and status.297 In fact,
potential licensees are often identified only through a faculty researcher’s
contacts with industry players298 and through personal relationships rather
than arm’s-length marketing.299
Of course, like patent protection, first-mover advantages, and other
290
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types of exclusivity, tacit knowledge is time-limited; tacit knowledge can
remain tacit for only so long. As understanding of an emerging technology
matures and spreads, others will gain access to the technology. Exactly how
long any such tacit knowledge might provide some sort of exclusivity in
nanotech development is an open question and likely depends on the
particular development at issue, but that being said, at least one study by
economists strongly suggests that the duration of nonpatent exclusivity
based on tacit knowledge and access to research tools was twice as long in
biotech as in nanotech.300
While tacit knowledge and other natural exclusivities over university
research continue to be in force, however, it is not surprising that
commercialization efforts in science-based technologies tend to concentrate
geographically around university faculty with the requisite expertise and
materials.301 Geographic collocation has the advantage of allowing handson participation by faculty members or others with pivotal tacit knowledge,
access to university technology incubators and research parks, and
collaboration or even acquisition of university-initiated start-up companies.
Indeed, in the last three decades or so, universities have begun to license
their upstream research patents to start-up companies at increasing rates.302
University start-ups could help solve some of the nonpatent problems in
developing upstream research.303 For example, start-ups may help both
transfer tacit knowledge and provide access to research tools and materials.
Faculty researchers and their graduate students commonly are active parts
of university-based start-ups and have become increasingly active
participants in private industry more generally, as research scientists now
commonly move between universities and industry and private firms host
postdoctoral fellows.304 The tacit knowledge these students and faculty
researchers possess continues to be exclusive to them,305 of course, until such
time that understanding of the underlying technology matures and spreads
and becomes less tacit over time.306 Nonetheless, faculty involvement in
start-ups and other private enterprises does at least provide a conduit by
300
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which tacit knowledge can be transferred to the commercial sector.
Likewise, to the extent that university-based start-ups make use of university
research tools and materials, start-ups can provide the commercial sector
with at least some, albeit limited, access to tools and materials over which
the university might exert proprietary rights.
To a lesser extent, start-ups may also help bridge the valley of death.
Although larger or at least established firms might have more expertise in
commercializing and marketing generally,307 start-ups offer their own
advantages.308 University start-ups generally are more nimble and less riskaverse than not only universities but also larger, more established firms. 309
Unlike their parent universities, moreover, university-based start-ups are
designed to be commercial entities that presumably will have the kinds of
market orientations that universities lack while also avoiding the
bureaucracy of university administrations and constituencies. And to the
extent that they are funded through alternatives to private investment,
university start-ups represent an intermediate (and separately funded and
executed) step between upstream research and marketable downstream
applications.310 Start-ups work on the intermediate development stages,
making commercialization less risky and more attractive to private
investors. And although only a small percentage of licensed university
research is introduced through start-ups rather than through more established
firms,311 university-based start-ups are by far the most common way for new
nanotechnology businesses to get their start;312 most nanotech companies
today are university-based start-ups.313
5. Multidisciplinarity and Personnel
One of the most exciting aspects of nanotechnology is its potential to
revolutionize an amazingly wide variety of technological and scientific
fields. As noted above, however, this cross-industry potential is also one of
nanotechnology development’s potential drawbacks, although not for the
reasons that Professor Lemley and others have posited. Development in
multidisciplinary fields involves not just the need to coordinate patents and
other legal rights but also the need to coordinate technological expertise
from among the relevant fields.314 Although mixing disciplines can create
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new paradigms that spur innovation, such “intellectual migration” is not
without its own transaction costs and uncertainty, completely independent
of patent rights or their distribution.315
That is to say, “nanotechnologists” do not simply appear out of thin air.
Nanotechnologists instead must be developed from other disciplines with
other technological paradigms.316 Like some other pioneering new
technologies, nanotechnology was born of parallel but independent tracks of
research in various fields. For instance, someone who started out as a
materials scientist may create a nanotech advance with promising
implications for medical research. To develop the invention further, the
materials scientist will need to collaborate with an expert in medicine,
biotechnology, or other fields, however, and the transaction costs of
identifying and coordinating with others from different fields to collaborate
on a new project can be steep. And even then, many factors create significant
social barriers to the multidisciplinary cooperation necessary to design
usable nanotechnology end products; institutional differences, lack of
interdisciplinary standards and protocols, peer and institutional support, and
other infrastructure, and even cultural differences between disciplines and
the “inertia of disciplinary tradition,” all can create a drag on the
development process.317 In these and other ways, the sociological aspects of
technology development and any attendant “culture shock” may slow
commercialization.
Perhaps because of nanotechnology’s multidisciplinary nature and the
need to unite specialists from many different areas, the majority of federal
funding in nanotechnology thus far has been through government research
laboratories rather than through university or private research facilities and
thus falls under the provisions of the Stevenson-Wydler Act rather than
Bayh-Dole.318 The Stevenson-Wydler Act allows government-operated
laboratories to enter into cooperative research and development agreements
(CRADAs) with private contractors and to license, exclusively or
nonexclusively, or even to assign title to, any resulting patents.319 In this
Journey on the Road to Translational Nanomedicine, 4 WIRES NANOMEDICINE & NANOBIOTECH. 366
(2012).
315
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regard, CRADAs are effectively cost-sharing agreements, with the
government contributing access to government equipment, facilities, and
personnel rather than research funds.320 The most relevant virtue of
CRADAs, moreover, is that they can pool the expertise of federal laboratory
researchers and private researchers from among a variety of disciplines—a
point particularly important to multidisciplinary areas such as
nanotechnology research.321
The federal government has also used public funds to establish other
types of research centers that can help solve many of the problems of
science-based technology development.322 One such center devoted
specifically to nanotechnology development is the Nanotechnology
Characterization Laboratory (NCL) at the National Cancer Institute, a
federally funded laboratory created as a collaborative effort among
pharmaceutical companies, university researchers, and government agencies
to offer free molecule-characterization services to universities and industrial
nanodrug developers working in translational medicine.323 The NCL thus
serves not only to standardize the metrics for nanoparticle characterization
but also to collect the necessary expertise from diverse institutions and
disciplines, including biologists, chemists, toxicologists, immunologists,
pathologists, technicians, and biomedical and chemical engineers, thus
helping to overcome interdisciplinary gaps.324 The NCL has the further
advantage of helping to usher nanodrugs through the riskier intermediate
development stages and to make those drugs more attractive to private
investors.325 Finally, the NCL is also a noncommercial organization that
produces no scientific publications or intellectual property but is nonetheless
more commercially oriented and flexible than any university could be.326
One unique and perhaps more significant aspect of nanotechnology that
may be slowing down its development, according to nanotech expert Eric
Drexler, is that government, private investors, and even scientists
Transfer that are specially created to facilitate private acquisition of federal research. MILLER ET AL.,
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themselves still do not fully appreciate what a true nanotechnology
revolution would mean.327 According to Drexler, the real definition of
nanotechnology is a radical and comprehensive transformation in how things
are manufactured, or what Drexler terms “atomically precise
manufacturing” (APM).328 Although closely related, the diffuse and largely
piecemeal innovations that society currently identifies as nanotechnology
have distracted from the bigger picture of what nanotechnology can offer
and delayed realization of this promise as a result.329
Specifically, Drexler argues that although development efforts in
nanotechnology thus far have led to the fabrication of new materials that
exploit the unique phenomenon occurring at the nanoscopic level,330 these
advances have led mostly to use of the new nanomaterials as incremental
improvements to existing technologies rather than fundamental changes in
manufacturing methods or APM.331 As one science historian put it,
nanotechnology “consists of different, largely ‘mono-disciplinary fields’
which are rather unrelated to each other and which hardly share more than
the “nano” prefix.”332 Drexler contends that nanotechnology is not just about
improving existing technologies, however, but rather about the profound
change in manufacturing globally that would come from APM.333 Although
a more scientific explanation of APM is obviously beyond the scope of the
discussion here, atomically precise manufacturing is in many ways
analogous to 3D printing or intracellular protein synthesis in that APM
allows fabrication of an infinite variety of materials and objects through
meticulous, sequential assembly of individual molecules of common
elements.334 Atomically precise manufacturing allows less expensive,
environmentally cleaner, and thus “ultra-efficient” industrial-level
production to take place not just in factories but also on desktops or
anywhere else.335 Atomically precise manufacturing will revolutionize
fabrication processes because APM uses less raw material to create objects
327
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that are stronger and yet lighter, thereby reducing both shipping costs and
energy costs.336 It is perhaps this kind of technologically brave new world
that many predicted nanotechnology would bring and that critics worry that
the Bayh-Dole Act has helped stymy.
And in fact, progress in APM has not been as rapid as Drexler and others
had hoped,337 but Drexler attributes the logjam to a lack of investment and
focus, not to upstream patenting.338 APM does exist to a limited extent in
some isolated fields, but systemic changes in manufacturing technologies
have yet to emerge.339 According to Drexler, this is due in part to the fact
that nanotechnology development continues to be scattered among divergent
scientific disciplines, a cohesive vision of APM is still lacking. 340
Government agencies and other investors have focused instead on the
development of nanoparticles and other lower hanging fruit with more
readily attainable and yet less impressive returns.341
6. Safety Fears
A different risk that some nanotechnology enthusiasts mention as a
problem for nanotech development is the health, environmental, and other
dangers that nanotech applications may pose. Nanotechnology’s relative
unfamiliarity has provoked the same kinds of fears that have beset research
in other research-based fields such as pharmaceuticals, genetically modified
organisms, cloning, and human embryonic stem cells.342 And because
nanotech is such a uniquely cross-disciplinary area of research, it has
applications and therefore potential safety ramifications in a number of
heavily regulated fields.343 In fact, to avoid triggering governmental
regulatory review or public apprehension, some companies may try to keep
their products “below the radar” by failing to identify products containing
nanomaterials.344 More importantly, concerns about possible regulatory
barriers have also dampened investment in nanotech development: the
specter of regulatory restrictions and potential liability for consumer,
environmental, or other harms create additional uncertainties that yet further
336
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deter private and even government funding in nanotech R&D. Public fears
about nanotechnology have also negatively influenced enthusiasm for the
field, and therefore its success.346
Some of the health and environmental concerns about nanotechnology
are well-founded. Graphene particles, for example, may present some risk
of respiratory damage, although review of graphene is ongoing.347 Similarly,
carbon nanotubes and buckyballs may be toxic when used in humans,
whereas dendrimers may be a less toxic alternative for use in living
organisms.348 Particular instances of environmental and health dangers have
apparently led to overgeneralization, however, and are leading some
commentators to worry that the toxicity of some nanomaterials has created
a stigma that encompasses all of nanotechnology in one stroke of the
brush.349
And the science-fiction-level hype around nanotechnology has indeed
led to popular but distorted fears about its safety. Some have even drawn on
science fiction to dream up sensationalist, apocalyptic scenarios for how
nanotechnology could herald the end of the world as we know it. Perhaps
the most infamous of this latter category is the late Michael Crichton’s “gray
goo:” self-replicating nanobots that escape the laboratory and run amok,
devouring the entire biosphere and turning it into copies of themselves.350
Such a nano-apocalypse is unlikely and perhaps even scientifically
impossible,351 but whether outlandish or reasonable, these fears have been
enough to spur calls for caution in and even a moratorium on
nanotechnology development until further research can be done on the
potential safety impact of the field and appropriate regulations can be put in
place.352 A 2000 article by Bill Joy of Sun Microsystems even went so far as
to call for a ban on nanotechnology because of its perceived perils to human
health and safety.353 Whether such moratoria or outright bans are warranted
and whether nanotechnology threatens health and environmental harms
significantly greater than those in other technologies are open questions. 354
345
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What is clear, however, is that apprehension about nanotechnology’s
potential hazards have helped obstruct progress in the field.
C. So Why Bother Patenting Science-Based Technologies at All?
The discussion above demonstrates that to attribute the lack of progress
in nanotechnology development solely or even primarily to the Bayh-Dole
Act and upstream patenting, university patenting, or the combination thereof
overlooks a whole host of other factors that play a much more significant
role in science-based technologies. This is not to say upstream research
patenting by universities is entirely inconsequential. On the one hand, the
costs of licensing upstream university patents may at the margin
occasionally tip the scales toward nondevelopment, as Professor Lemley and
others have argued.355 Alternatively, as this author has argued, upstream
patents may on very rare occasions facilitate downstream development.356
The vast majority of upstream patents held by universities in science-based
technologies, however, are simply irrelevant either as a handicap or as a help
in downstream development.
The question then becomes, why would universities take the trouble to
patent their research at all? And why did Congress believe it to be a good
idea to pass the Bayh-Dole Act and to encourage universities to patent their
research? If patents on basic university research have so little effect on
downstream commercialization of that research, at the very least universities
are simply wasting their already limited resources in bothering to file and
prosecute patent applications.
And in fact, universities do not patent the vast majority of their faculties’
research, as noted above.357 Very little of university research is eligible for
patenting, an even smaller percentage is worth the costs of patenting, and
almost no university research yields profits from patent licensing.358 As a
result, most university TTOs operate at a loss; again, patenting and licensing
university research is a money-losing proposition for all but the fortunate
few.359
That being said, not all university patents and university research fall
into the category of basic upstream research, and not all university research
355
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is performed solely for the sake of knowledge. As a first matter, patents on
university inventions in applied rather than basic research, such as university
research in engineering, applied sciences, and some areas of biotechnology,
require fewer and less risky additional steps to achieve commercialization
and therefore are easier to license and higher in commercial value.360 And
even in the basic sciences, patented university research often serves dual
roles both as upstream building blocks for downstream development and as
“completed” products ready for use as commercially available research
tools.361 Second, private firms that sponsor university research will often ask
the university to patent any consequent inventions and to grant these firms
exclusive licenses to those patents.362 Patents therefore can be worthwhile
for the small percentage of university research conducted under private
sponsorship agreements.363 Third, universities may be willing to invest in
patenting because of the reputational benefits patents provide,364 although
publication and other less costly signals of productivity may serve just as
well.365
But as for why universities patent research outside of these rather narrow
categories, the most likely explanation is the “home run mentality” of some
university TTOs and even faculty.366 Because of what has now become the
near-mythological status of the patents on Harvard’s OncoMouse and the
University of Wisconsin’s human stem cell technology, whose unusually
high commercial value garnered millions in revenue for their respective
universities,367 many TTOs have come to regard university research patents
as a sort of lottery ticket through which the TTOs hope eventually to hit it
big on the one blockbuster patent that will earn untold fame and fortune for
360
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368

the university and the inventing faculty. This home-run mindset has led
TTOs to hold some arguably unrealistic expectations about their patents’
value and to focus too much of their limited resources on pursuing patents
on the technologies with the greatest perceived blockbuster potential.369
Because of the uncertainty inherent in science-based technologies, however,
the eventual commercial value of upstream patents in these fields is highly
variable and difficult to predict,370 much like a lottery ticket. Not
surprisingly, the home-run mentality has caused universities to invest in
filing and accumulating patents that ultimately have little to no commercial
value.
It is therefore not surprising that, when stuck with patents that turn out
to have no market value, universities often decide not to pay maintenance
fees for the patents and allow them to fall into the public domain instead.371
Professor Kimberly Moore’s study of patent-renewal rates and maintenancefee payments provides corroborative evidence, documenting that early-stage
patents are more likely to lapse for nonpayment of maintenance fees where
the underlying technologies’ development costs are high and where private
industry has shown little interest in the technologies.372 And recently,
Pennsylvania State University went so far as to use an auction of fifty-nine
of its unlicensed engineering patent portfolios to gather useful information
on what types of patents were no longer worth the cost of paying
maintenance fees.373 Thus, although university TTOs may in the short term
be overly optimistic about patenting their research, in the longer term
universities seem to recognize that most of those patents are pointless to
maintain.
CONCLUSION
Nanotechnology is promised to be the next technological revolution, but
368
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development in the field has been slower than many had hoped. As Professor
Siva Vaidhyanathan observed in 2005, “right now nanotechnology is more
science than technology (some would argue more science fiction than
science).”374 The question is, why? Given the relatively high levels of
patenting on university research in the area, it is understandable that
Professor Lemley and several other commentators suspect that these patents
are hindering nanotech’s development transfer from university research to
commercialized application. Translating research and knowledge into
useable technologies depends on more than just intellectual property
rights,375 and the importance of patents versus other methods of technology
transfer varies widely from case to case.376 For nanotechnology, many if not
most of university patents will have little effect on future nanotechnology
development. Although some very small percentage of nanotech
development may experience anticommons or other holdup problems
because of upstream university patenting, development of other applications
may be experiencing delays that have little to do with patenting ownership
patterns or the degree of patenting on upstream research.
First, with regard to the risk of patent-induced holdup problems: a patent
that covers “basic” or “upstream” research will not necessarily have enough
preemptive breadth to hold up downstream development.377 Many upstream
nanotech patents may resemble gene sequence patents in that they require
downstream work to be of commercial value but still are narrow enough that
they can be easily designed around using meaningful substitutes. Such
upstream but substitutable patents are unlikely to cause holdup problems.378
Unless a patent covers one of the few foundational or “common-method
research tools” and unless those patents are not licensed freely, little in the
way of hold up is likely to occur.379
As compared to patents, moreover, other technological, economic, and
sociologic issues may be much more significant drags on technological
development than commonly realized. Nonpatent exclusivities, as well as
risk aversion, lack of funding, and information gaps, play significant roles
in the development of science-based technologies such as nanotech. Where
access to research materials and tools, tacit knowledge, lack of private
capital, and lack of public support are more rate-limiting than patents, as
appears to be the case in most of nanotechnology development at this point
in time, patents are for most intents and purposes simply irrelevant.
Likewise, the overall effect of patenting depends greatly on the inherent
374
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uncertainties of and the time and expense necessary to developing
downstream applications. Especially in revolutionary new fields like
nanotechnology, the more time- and resource-intensive downstream
development becomes, the more uncertainty attaches, and the less likely it
is that upstream university patents will be important to the outcome.
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